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I. Background of the thesis 
In the last decade the economic growth of most European countries has 
lagged behind the escalating health care expenditure. Even economically 
leading countries like Germany and France have seen their health care 
outlays increase to more than ten percent of their GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product). Rising health care costs as a proportion of GDP, increasing drug 
expenditure as a proportion of health care outlays  
 
Table 1: Health expenditure in % of the GDP in key OECD countries (1995-
2006) 
Health Expenditure 
in % of the GDP 1995 2000 2006 
Austria 9,7 9,9 10,1 
Denmark 8,1 8,3 9,5 
France 9,9 9,6 11,1 
Germany 10,1 10,3 10,6 
Netherlands 8,3 8,0 9,3 
Norway 7,9 8,4 8,7 
Spain 7,4 7,2 8,4 
Sweden 8,0 8,2 9,2 
United Kingdom 6,9 7,2 8,4 
United States 13,3 13,2 15,3 
Source: Data from the OECD 
 
have induced European health policy makers to regulate pharmaceutical 
markets. These regulations intend to decrease drug costs and regulate the 
access to medicines in the market. Therefore, the main focus of several 
countries has been to implement effective price regulations and 
reimbursement schemes to make drugs accessible to everyone and 
decrease financial differences within the country. 
 
Hope for health care savings has always been seen in generic use. Generics 
are drugs which are chemically equivalent to originator brands. They are 
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allowed to enter the drug market after the patent of the branded 
pharmaceutical has expired. Usually their prices are much below the branded 
pharmaceuticals because no further development costs occur. Moreover, 
manufacturers try to undercut the originators´ prices to enter the market and 
gain market share. 
 
Accordingly, one major focus of the implemented pricing and reimbursement 
regulations in Europe has been to increase generics´ market share and 
through competition, allow prices of generics and originators to decline in 
order to diminish the ongoing trend of growing health care expenses. 
However, evidence to that effect is uncertain and positive effects seem to be 
limited. The acceptance of generics by patients, prescribing by physicians 
and dispensation by pharmacies does not fulfil the desired expectations. 
Generics´ market shares are only slowly growing and producers of branded 
pharmaceuticals seem to be better off keeping their original prices than 
adjusting them to generic price levels.  
 
To date, there is some evidence of impact of regulation on generic 
competition and the dimension to which generic drugs can deliver savings to 
health care systems. Therefore, analyses of regulations and their influence 
on pharmaceutical prices is interesting for policy makers when determining 
price changes, which regulations are effective and which should be displaced 
by other approaches. 
 
This thesis intends to analyse the general impact of regulation and branded 
medicine prices on  generic pharmaceutical prices in six pharmaceutical 
markets in Europe (UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, 
Sweden) post patent expiry. Using an empirical investigation on specific 
regulations and variables the thesis aims to address three specific questions. 
First, to what extent does regulation impact generic prices? Second, do the 
prices of originators have an influence on the prices of generics? If so, what 
direction does it take? And third, to what degree can competition be 
increased through generic penetration? 
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The structure of the thesis includes six main sections: chapter 2 provides an 
overview on the research that has been conducted on the general impact of 
generics and regulatory influence on pharmaceutical prices. Chapter 3 
discusses national regulation in general, and summarizes pricing and 
reimbursement measures in six countries. Chapter 4 presents the conceptual 
framework and develops the empirical model and the methodology used 
based on a panel data approach. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
empirical investigation, which are subsequently discussed and summarized 
in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 draws the main conclusions. 
 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
The market for pharmaceuticals is complex and the factors influencing prices 
of generics are manifold. The literature has mainly focused on the supply 
side aswell as on the demand-side factors of price. Main focus of the 
literature is to identify the factors which influence the price regarding changes 
of consumption and sales. The size of literature dealing with regulation 
influences on prices in general or the influence of competition and generic 
entry on the price of branded pharmaceuticals is striking. Nevertheless, 
literature about the impact of regulations on generics´ prices or generic price 
changes ex post patent expiry is rare. 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a short overview of the most 
important literature, to identify key papers and report about scientific results 
in the field described above. 
 
II.1 Regulation and Generic Entry 
Empirical evidence has shown that countries with low prices and much 
regulation tend to have fewer branded and generic launches than 
unregulated markets. In addition launch delays are much longer (Danzon, 
Wang and Wang, 2005). This discouragement of rapid product and generic 
entry has also been pointed out by Jean O. Lanjouw about poor countries 
(2005). In 2005 and to a greater extend in 2007 Margaret Kyle reflects on the 
behaviour of firms by showing that the entry of products and generics is less 
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likely to happen in low price economies and in countries with less regulation. 
Quite similar results were achieved by Patricia Danzon and Andrew Epstein 
in 2005 in their paper. They showed that firms launch earlier in high price EU 
countries and in countries with brand competitor prices. Firms tend to delay 
their launch in countries with generic competition. Danzon and Epstein find 
that firms launch strategically due to the direct influence of existing prices for 
the same drug in other countries (Danzon and Epstein, 2005). Recent 
empirical research has been done comparing major EU countries with the US 
and Canada. Findings suggest that most European countries, which tend to 
be more regulated than the US, show a comparably large presence of 
generic entrants (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). 
 
II.2 Generic Entry and its Effects 
It is still an open question if and how large generic entry actually change 
prices in the pharmaceutical market. Numerous studies with varying results 
have been published. However, empirical evidence suggests that through 
generic entry branded prices increase are accompanied by a decrease in the 
prices of generics (Frank and Salkever, 1992, 1997; Grabowski and Vernon, 
1986). This phenomenon is known as the “generic paradox”. 
 
The so called “generic paradox” suggests limited competition between the 
originator and generics. However, the number of generics might have an 
influence on the general price level via other substitution factors (Grabowski 
and Vernon 1994). This is the reason why the “generic paradox” results are 
still questioned. By including fixed effects to the model to control the 
unobservable factors that might have impact on prices Wiggins and Maness 
tried to show that incumbent’s prices do not increase (1995, 2004).  In 1991 it 
was shown empirically that on average, generic competition reduces 
incumbent brand’s price by approximately 2%. This is a minimal effect, 
considering that generic sellers quoted prices 40% to 70% lower than 
branded pharmaceutical sellers´ prices (Wiggins and Maness, 1995, 2004).  
 
The number of branded substitutes still has a negative effect on the launch 
prices of new products. This is often seen as an indicator of competition 
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pressure (Lu and Comanor, 1998). This competition is also existent among 
generic substitutes as shown by Ellison in 1997. Ellison found substantially 
cross-price elasticity among generic substitutes which also explains the 
decline in prices of generics (Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches and Hausman, 
1997). 
 
Wiggins and Maness showed in 2004 that generic prices decrease over 
years, which suggests generic competition and a great homogeneity among 
generic products in addition to a product differentiation towards branded 
pharmaceuticals (Wiggins and Maness, 1995). The market share of generics 
for certain products usually becomes quite large in short periods in most 
countries.  Research has found that only after one year of entry, generic 
pharmaceuticals won a 44% share of POMs dispensed in the US market 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1986, 1992). 
 
Some recent empirical evidence suggests that for a small number of 
pharmaceuticals there are also competitive effects between the branded 
pharmaceuticals and generics in the presence of reimbursement regulation 
(Kanavos and Srivastava, 2008). Nevertheless, these are exceptions and in 
general the “generic paradox” seems to rely. 
  
II.3 Regulation Effect on Generic Paradox and Prices 
Price competition between generic competitors appears more often in less 
regulated markets and it seems that regulated pharmaceutical markets 
disable generic competition. However, generic entry and its impact differ due 
to regulations and the degree of pharmaceutical policies in the selected 
country (Danzon and Chao, 2000). 
 
Recent research which included the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and 
France has shown that for the UK and France the “generic paradox” (no 
decline of originator prices after generic entry) relies. However, originator’s 
prices declined in Germany and the Netherlands (Vandoros and Kanavos, 
2008). An explanation might be that Germany and the Netherlands have 
implied reference pricing systems combined with several demand side 
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policies. Nevertheless, results concerning regulatory influences on the 
“generic paradox” remain unclear. Empirical ambiguity was recently 
presented in a study analysing originator’s prices after generic entry in six 
major EU countries. By considering all countries together results suggest 
originators´ prices to increase after generic entry. Surprisingly in a second 
procedure considering each country separately the results were 
approximately the same for the UK and Sweden but unclear for the remaining 
(more regulated) countries (Vandoros and Kanavos, 2008).  
 
While regulatory influence on the “generic paradox” seems to remain 
uncertain, empirical evidence has given some political recommendations to 
decrease generic prices. The 2008 study by Kanavos, Costa-Font and 
Seeley has suggested that reference pricing, a part of reimbursement policy, 
does decrease generic prices but only marginally. Brekke, Grasdal and 
Holmas (2006) and in the same year the economists Dalen, Strom and 
Haabeth (2006) analysed a change in Norway in 1993 from a price cap 
system to a reference based pricing system as well as its influence on 
pharmaceutical prices. The data showed that the reform reduced brand-
name and generic prices within the reference groups and enlarged generics´ 
market share. Although it needs to be considered that these results do not 
imply that the decline would have been smaller if there had been no market 
intervention at all (Kanavos 2008). Still Reference Pricing has influenced 
health care expenditure in several countries. I.e., in 2001 a study on 
Germany by Busse found that the savings accumulated by implementing 
reference pricing were the equal to nine percent of drug expenditure (Busse, 
2001). 
 
Supply-side regulations can only be efficient if appropriate demand-side 
implications have been installed (Mrazek, 2002). E.g., in 2002, Pavcnik 
demonstrated that not only consumers but also firms do react to potential 
out-of-pocket payments by patients. If co-payments are increased, firms 
respond with a decrease in prices (Pavcnik, 2002). Hence, demand-side 
regulations on patients, pharmacies and physicians seem to be necessary to 
decrease pharmaceuticals prices and increase generic market shares.  
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Basically demand-side regulations and incentives can aim patients´ 
consumption, physicians´ prescription behaviour or pharmacies dispensing 
(Kanavos, 2008) which may be implemented on a non-monetory or monetary 
basis (Chaix-Conturier, Durand-Zaleski, Jolly and Durieux, 2000). Empirical 
evidence has shown that regulations that encourage or oblige pharmacists to 
substitute branded pharmaceuticals do increase the market share of the 
substitutes significantly (Andersson, Petzold, Allebeck and Carlston, 2008). 
Other suggested demand-side regulations such as regressive 
pharmaceutical retail margins and policies focussing on physicians´ 
prescription behaviour like drug budgets show do increase generics´ market 
share (Walley, Mrazek and Mossialos 2004). Although Schulenburg and 
Schöffski research suggested quite similar results in 1997 they also found in 
a natural experiment that the number of hospitals admissions and referrals 
increased significantly after Germany’s introduction of pharmaceutical 
budgets in 1994. 
 
 
 
III. Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Market 
 
III.1 The Context 
Access, efficiency, safety and supply of pharmaceuticals play a major role in 
all European countries. Governments and civilians put a huge financial effort 
in the pharmaceutical market every year. However, actual funding of the 
health expenditure can be very different and can be raised by several groups 
within most countries. Private health insurances, statutory health insurances, 
out-of pocket payments, employers, taxes or other private organizations can 
possibly be in charge of financing parts of the expenditures. The distribution 
among funding parties varies in Europe. The countries´ expenditure partitions 
vary from countries with very low private participation (e.g., 10% in the 
Netherlands and 12.6% in the UK) to countries with high private funding 
shares (e.g., the new EU member states like Latvia and Cyprus with 
approximately 50%)1. 
                                                 
1
 Source: PPRI Report 2007 
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Not only the structure but also the total outlay of health care systems vary 
significantly among the EU states. However, one issue all EU countries have 
to face is that the total health expenditure (THE) in proportion to the GDP 
(THE/GDP) has been climbing up in all EU countries in the last decade. The 
average THE/GDP in the European Union was 7.81% in 19952. This average 
has gone up to 8.87% in 20063. Still the variances are huge and there are 
striking differences between the new EU countries, Scandinavian countries 
and other EU states. Some countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Spain and Norway for example still had an average THE/GDP of 
approximately 8% in 1995. This has reached a mean of 9% in 2006. 
Compared to the new European member states this increase of 
approximately 1% is quite moderate. Some old EU member states like 
Germany and France already had quite a high expenditure rate (THE/GDP) 
in 1995, but still increased it till 2006. Especially France had one of the 
highest rates in Europe with 11.1% in 2006.  
However, health care outlays in proportion of the GDP have grown between 
1995 and 2006 in most OECD countries (Table 1). This trend was not only 
based on a rising population within the countries. Moreover, statistics show 
that even the total expenditure on health per capita has been rising 
tremendously4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Average calculated from the OECD data 2008 for 11 available countries 
3
 Average calculated from the OECD data 2008 for 11 available countries 
4
 Source OECD Data 2008 
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Table 2: Total Expenditure on Health per Capita in US$ PPP in key OECD 
countries (1995-2006) 
Total Expenditure on Health per Capita in US$ PPP
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Source: OECD Data 2008 
 
Another relevant expenditure statistic gives the drug expenditure in 
proportion total health expenditure. Drug outlays in Europe differ. The olds 
fifteen EU member states have had (with an approximate average of 16.1% 
in 2005) relatively speaking lower drug expenditure than the new EU states 
(25.5%)5. However, nearly all countries can track an ongoing process of 
increase throughout the last decade6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Source: PPRI Report 2007 
6
 Source OECD Data 2008 
 16 
Table 3: Drug Expenditure in % of the total THE in key OECD countries 
(1995-2006) 
Drug Expenditure  
in % of the THE 1995 2000 2006 
Austria 9,2 11,9 12,4 
Denmark 9,1 8,8 8,5 
France 16,0 18,2 16,4 
Germany 12,9 13,6 14,8 
Netherlands 11,0 11,7  
Norway 9,0 9,5 8,5 
Spain 19,2 21,3 21,7 
Sweden 12,3 13,8 13,3 
United Kingdom 15,3   
United States 8,9 11,7 12,6 
Source: OECD Data 2008 
 
Intuitively, either prices of drugs, their consumption or both have increased. 
Some exceptions are given by France, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. 
However, drug expenditure per capita has grown in nearly all key EU 
countries.  
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Table 4: Drug Expenditure per Capita in US$ PPP 
Drug Expenditure per Capita in US$ PPP
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Source: OECD Data 2008 
Therefore, it can be concluded that in the countries with a decreasing drug 
expenditure in proportion of the THE (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
France) have just shown a slower increase in drug outlays than in total health 
care expenditure. 
 
The drug expenditure per capita in US$ PPP has increased in most 
countries, even though the steps are of different heights. The USA for 
example has shown nearly a doubling in expenditure between 2000 and 
2006. The European states have made smaller jumps, but also presented 
acknowledgeable inflations of drug expenditures per capita.  
 
Statistics, however, on health care expenditure shows why most European 
states are impelled to regulate the market with pricing and reimbursement 
schemes, seeking for more competition among therapeutically similar 
products, for reductions in prices and immoderate consumption and savings 
from opportunities like generic entry.  
 
III.2 The Pharmaceutical Market 
There is no doubt that the health care sector is not only one of the largest 
markets in most economies but also one of the most regulated ones. First of 
all these regulations do not only show a huge variety across European health 
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care systems but also diverse effects and approaches on prices in the 
markets. First this chapter focuses on explaining the uniqueness of the 
pharmaceutical market and its stakeholders and consequent reasons for 
regulations. Secondly it gives an overview on all kinds of pricing and 
reimbursement regulations including an overview table. Thirdly the chapter 
presents information based on WHO data about the health care expenses 
trend of the last decade.  Finally an extensive review of the health care 
systems and its regulations in the selected countries (Germany, UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Sweden and Denmark) is provided. 
 
The dispensation and payment for pharmaceuticals follow a simple, mainly 
similar structure in most developed countries. Nearly all markets have 
several stakeholders who play specific roles in the flow of money and 
pharmaceuticals. On the one hand there are manufacturers, wholesalers and 
pharmacies that dispense and on the other hand act third-party payers, 
physicians and patients who finance, prescribe or consume. However, unique 
about the drug market is that the flow of money passes other stakeholders 
than the drug flow due to the existence of third-party payers. 
 
Drugs go through several stations before reaching the final consumer. After 
being licensed by the government and produced by the manufacturers drugs 
are sold to wholesalers. These dispense the drugs to requiring pharmacies 
throughout a country. Finally pharmacies sell the products to consumers who 
got a prescription for a certain drug from different physicians who select a 
medicine on their behalf. 
 
The money flow is also linear but a bit more complex than the distribution of 
drugs. Money flows through several stations before reaching the initial 
manufacturer. Insured individuals pay a certain amount to third-party payers 
(e.g., insurances) either through taxes or through contribution which might 
indirectly be controlled by the government. When a patient buys a product it 
can be financed in two ways. It can be financed through the third-party 
payers and corresponding co-payment through the patient. The second 
possibility is that it is a non-reimbursed pharmaceutical and patients need to 
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pay the whole amount to pharmacies. After the pharmacy station the money 
moves to wholesalers and finally to the producer. Every station usually gains 
a certain margin from reselling the drug. 
 
The economic literature is almost stuffed with discussions dealing with the 
question of necessity of regulation in general and where deregulation may 
lead. The main arguments for regulation are the existence of natural 
monopoly (decreasing average and marginal cost curve), external effects, 
inelastic demand and asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse 
selection). In a lot of non-economic literature the argument of inequalities of 
income and wealth is also used to defend price regulations and 
reimbursement schemes. 
 
In most countries prices and reimbursement within the pharmaceutical 
markets are regulated by authorities. From an economic point of view these 
regulations can not be defended with the usual monopoly argument like it is 
done in many sectors such as electricity or telecommunication. However, the 
drug market does also have monopolies but their existence is not natural. 
They are only monopolies because governments approve patents to give 
monetary incentives to invest in research and development. 
 
The main reason for governmental price regulation in the pharmaceutical 
market is asymmetric information in the market and the will to limit the total 
health expenses. Governments have an interest in this limitation because 
often states finance social insurance systems in which pharmaceutical 
expenses are reimbursed to make drugs accessible to everyone. These 
systems face the problem of asymmetric information and corresponding 
moral hazard situations. Health insurers and patients have an inelastic 
demand curve, do not know what the right treatment is and whether a 
medicine is appropriate or not. Insured civilians do not need to pay for drug 
costs and therefore tend to consume unnecessarily expensive drugs. The 
same rule holds for pharmacies and physicians who tend to over prescribe or 
offer too expensive drugs. Therefore it is nearly impossible for health 
insurances to control the expenses without any regulation. Hence a 
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governmental price regulation is a treatment to decrease Moral-Hazard 
problems in the pharmaceutical market.  
 
The degree of regulation, monopoly situations within the market (e.g., 
Sweden and its pharmacies), co-payment for consumers and corresponding 
reimbursement rates depend on the social history of the country and its 
cultural roots. Due to the mentioned reasons governments try to achieve 
through regulations certain goals, namely adjust distribution, reach an 
optimal allocation of resources and stabilize the spending for health 
insurance. In a more detailed view specific regulations are directed to 
achieve equal access to medical care, to control prices and volume of 
medical services consumed, to provide monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to patients and suppliers to limit their use of scarce resources and 
to ration services which are consumed on the expense of public sources7. 
 
III.3 Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets 
Within the health care sector, the pharmaceutical market is one of the most 
heavily regulated sectors in most industrialised countries8. To structure the 
tools of regulation on the market for pharmaceuticals it is usually 
distinguished between suppliers and demanders.  
 
In pharmaceutical markets, the supply side consists of drug manufacturers 
and wholesalers. The demand side can be split in three parts, namely 
physicians, pharmacists and patients. Although, there are interactions 
between the demand and supply side there is still a strict separation between 
the two. This is partly only chosen for didactic purpose. For instance, one 
could argue that pharmacists should be part of the supply side, however we 
will define it as part of the demand side, as pharmacists act – like prescribing 
physicians as agents of the patient 9 . In most developed countries this 
demand side does usually not pay for pharmaceuticals itself. It is partially, or 
completely, financed by a “third party payer” like a public or private insurance 
                                                 
7
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 7-11 
8
 Rovira, Espin: Presentation in Brussels: Study on Pharmaceutical Policy Practices, 30th of January 
2007 
9
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 27, 28 
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or a tax financed National Health Service. Obviously this influences 
(increases) the demand of the demand side and leads to a new market 
equilibrium in the market 10 . The following graph gives an overview on 
possible regulations: 
 
Table 5 and Table 6: Overview on regulations on the supply- and demand-
side 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National governments and their authorities often implement several controls, 
incentives and measurements to influence and control supply of and demand 
for pharmaceuticals. In the following it will be presented what kind of 
regulations exist and how these influence supply and demand. 
    
   
                                                 
10
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 27, 28 
Overview on Regulations on the Supply-
side 
 
A. Supply Side 
 
1. Price Control 
 
Based on:       Clinical performance 
Economic performance 
Cost of existing treatments 
Cost-plus calculations 
International prices 
Controlled price update 
 
2. Free Pricing 
 
3. Control of Expenditure                       
                       Discounts 
Rebates 
Pay-back 
Price-volume agreements 
Use of prize-freezes and 
cuts 
 
4. Industrial Regulation 
Profit Control/rate-of-
return 
Tax benefits 
 
5. Reimbursement 
                        Reference Pricing 
                        Negative list 
Overview on Regulations on the Demand-
side 
 
A. Demand side 
 
1. Physicians 
 
                       Clinical practice 
                       Prescription guidelines 
                       Education 
                       Information 
                       Monitoring/Audit 
                       Prescription quotas 
                       Pharmaceutical budgeting 
                       Overall budgets 
 
2. Patients 
 
                       Cost sharing 
                       Information 
                       Education 
                       OTC spending 
 
3. Pharmacies 
                    
                       Generic substitution 
                       Monetary incentives 
                       Clawbacks 
                       Margins 
                       Discounts 
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III.4 Regulation of Supply 
There are four groups of regulations or methods that can influence the supply 
side11: 
 
The first way to regulate the market is by Price Controls. What price control 
actually does is that it limits the price at which a pharmaceutical may be sold. 
In some cases, for instance in a country with a high reimbursement rate, 
price controls are the only way to limit expenditure for health insurances (see 
section on why to regulate the pharmaceutical market). The actual amounts 
that have to be paid by patients, pharmacies and sickness funds are usually 
set on the basis of the interplay of reimbursement, co-payment and the price 
itself.  
 
However, the initial price is ordinarily either implemented as a maximum price 
for a limit or as a fixed price as the only possible price for the product. 
Regulations can differ. The initial price might for example depend on clinical 
performance, economic evaluation like cost-effectiveness analysis, costs of 
already existing similar treatments, the basis of calculation (e.g., average, 
lowest price), costs plus a certain profit margin or on international and 
national prices of the same product12. 
 
Price control is not necessarily implemented in all systems. Medicines can 
also follow Free Pricing systems in which prices may be freely chosen by 
the manufacturer, wholesalers or even pharmacies13. 
 
A second more indirect group of measurements to control suppliers’ prices 
and actions is through Expenditure Control Methods. These controls are 
often being used because price controls tend to be unable to control 
pharmaceutical expenditures due to rising utilization14.  
 
                                                 
11
 Description and Explanations based on an author compilation from: PPRI Reports (2006, 2007, 
2008), Espin and Rovira (2007), Kanavos, Font and Mcguire (2007) 
12
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 29 
13
 PPRI Report 2007, p. 59 
14
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 29 
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Two typical methods are rebates and discounts. Discounts can either be 
negotiated or mandatory reductions are imposed so that certain institutional 
demanders get in the drug’s final price15. Rebates include any returns of the 
sales made by a manufacturer to an institutional payer16.  
 
A second policy is a price-volume agreement in which through negotiation 
between the industry and authorities a maximum sales-volume is fixed. This 
volume is determined through and based on forecast sales. If the producer 
exceeds this sales barrier it is penalized and forced to decrease its price or 
pay back a certain amount. 
 
Expenditure can also be controlled through payback methods. These are 
mechanisms that force producers to return certain amounts of their revenue 
to the purchaser if the revenue is higher than “ex ante” determined. Paybacks 
are often used as thread methods for price-volume agreements. 
 
 
The last possible direct interference with the expenditure are price cuts and 
price freezing methods. Either fixed or percentage based price decreases are 
applied to all pharmaceutical products or a certain latitude is imposed so that 
just specific products or particular medical sectors are confronted with price 
reductions. 
 
The third block of regulation that influences the supply side is the Industrial 
Regulation. This is a more indirect way to influence pricing in particular 
markets. Instead of directly interfering in pricing strategies of companies, 
regulations are set to mark a profit limit.  So profits are manipulated and 
consequently indirectly prices reduced. 
 
Other possibilities to implement industrial regulations are tax benefits. In this 
case it might be possible to give tax benefits for investments in R&D or in 
manufacturing capacity17. 
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 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 29 
17
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 30 
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The fourth regulation sector that influences suppliers is described by Product 
Reimbursement. The amount that third-party payers pay for a drug differs 
and follows the principle of selective financing. This means that not all 
products are reimbursed with the same rate. Consequently the 
reimbursement level influences manufacturers in their price decisions. 
However, patients can also be affected by co-payment which might occur if 
reimbursement rates are lower than 100%. This way Product Reimbursement 
can also influence the demand side. Some countries use different kinds of 
evaluation methods to support their decision on reimbursement of products. 
This influences the suppliers, knowing that they might set a low price, to 
guarantee e.g., cost-effective pharmaceutical product. Normally authorities 
manage their reimbursement record with either a positive or a negative list. A 
positive list includes all the products which are being reimbursed and a 
negative list just mentions the products that are excluded from 
reimbursement. 
 
One often used subgroup of reimbursement regulations are reference pricing 
systems. These define a reimbursement rate or level for all products within a 
specific group or cluster of drugs. In the case that manufacturers decrease 
their prices to the level of reference prices 100% of the expenses are being 
paid by third-part payers. Otherwise it follows the same structure as usual 
reimbursement under 100% and co-payment occurs. That is also the reason 
why reference pricing is often referred to as cost-sharing. 
 
III.5 Regulation of Demand 
If prescriptions for pharmaceutical therapies by doctors are cost-effective 
treatments is an open question. This question is even more complicated in 
the long run. Lower health care expenditures today can lead to higher costs 
in the long run. As the physician as well as the patient and the third party 
payer are influencing the demand for pharmaceuticals it is important to find a 
balanced mix of incentives to physicians as well to patients to achieve a cost-
effective drug treatment of the population to decrease the current trend in 
rising drug expenditure. 
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That is why regulation of the demand sector is important to provide safety to 
patients, possible home care and incentives to achieve cost-effective medical 
care. The demand side consists of three units, namely physicians, patients 
and pharmacists. These can be guided and regulated through different 
monetary incentives, regulations, schooling and information exchange 
methods18. 
 
Physicians usually prescribe medicines on behalf of the patients’ health. All 
regulative mechanisms for physicians can be reinforced by financial or non-
financial incentives. Physicians can be partly controlled and guided in their 
prescription decision. Here guidelines can itemize what prescriptions are 
allowed to be prescribed, which once are reimbursable and how long 
prescriptions are valid for certain diseases. The intention is to stimulate cost-
conscientiousness, promote a more rational use of medicines, minimize risk 
and costs and maximize effectiveness. 
 
The right choice and the minimization of risk for patients can be supported 
and upgraded by educational barriers (classification for physicians) and 
information methods. Some countries for example implemented 
computerized decision support and online prescribing advises for physicians. 
Another installation that controls and keeps track with prescriptions is to 
monitor prescribing patterns.  
 
Regulation of physicians can also be achieved by establishing prescription 
quotas and pharmaceutical budgets. The quotas can for example force 
physicians to prescribe a certain percentage of generics. This could increase 
effectiveness, decrease costs and facilitate entry of generics in the market. 
Pharmaceutical budgets motivate physicians to be cost-conscious when it 
comes to selecting between alternative treatments. 
 
Pharmacies usually purchase pharmaceuticals from wholesalers and 
afterwards sell POMs to patients with a particular prescription.  
                                                 
18
 Description and Explanations based on an author compilation from: PPRI Reports (2006, 2007, 
2008), Espin and Rovira (2007), Kanavos, Font and Mcguire (2007) 
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Pharmacies are regulated through three main fields. Generic substitution, 
which has been one of the main issues in the last decade is a law that 
regulates the connection of generics to prescriptions when it comes to 
distributing pharmaceuticals. Authorities might either encourage or oblige 
physicians to distribute generics instead of originators when a patient 
requires a certain product. Thus policy makers try to increase generics´ 
market shares, cost-effectiveness and improve entry possibilities for 
substitutes.  
 
Healthcare authorities also implement monetary incentives for pharmacists 
with traditional pharmacy mark-up or fixed pharmacy margin systems. To 
maximize their profit, pharmacists intend to ask for the highest possible price, 
substitute for the most costly drug in a drug group or try to sell the largest 
packages with the lowest effort to achieve high quality services. Regulatory 
measures are taken to provide financial incentives. This is done by mark-up 
regulations, substitution guidelines and a specific regulatory framework for 
pharmacies. 
 
Potentially countries can implement claw-backs. They can have different 
variations. Pharmacies can for example give discounts to public or private 
insurances by decreasing reimbursement rates. Another option is that claw-
backs refer to discounts on pharmacy purchase costs for pharmaceuticals19. 
 
The last station of the drug flow and eventually most important part of the 
demand side are the patients. Due to high reimbursement levels in most EU 
countries, their cost-consciousness is often minimal which leads to needless 
expenses. Ergo governments try to implement regulations to encourage 
patients for cost-aware behaviour. Patients can be influenced in their 
decisions through fixed fees, cost sharing and insurance participation. These 
variables can increase or decrease the demand of patients. 
 
                                                 
19
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 31 
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Cost-sharing, which is the most common way of affecting patients, is used in 
many countries. There are many variations in implementing it. Cost sharing 
might, for example, be set by a fixed co-payment for drugs (per item, per 
packet etc.) or a fixed fee that has to be given to pharmacists for consultation 
hours or prescriptions. These payments may also be variable percentage of 
the prescribed drug’s price. 
 
Another possibility of affecting patients´ behaviour lies in informational and 
educational campaigns. This might increase their awareness of co-payment, 
roomers about generics and responsibility for economic use of 
pharmaceuticals. 
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Table 7: Overview on supply-side regulations in six EU countries, 2007 
Country Price control Reimbursement 
Control of 
Expenditure 
Industrial 
Regulation 
United 
Kingdom 
Branded pharmaceuticals 
are regulated by PPRS 
(rate-of-return) 
 
Some generics have to 
follow the Maximum Price 
Scheme (2000- 2005) 
Negative list 
 
Guidance on cost-
effectiveness by NICE  
 
For reimbursement 
generics prices need to 
adapt to Drug Tariff 
 
NICE has published 
new “single technology 
appraisal” in 2007 
 
Payback schemes are 
installed 
 
Price cuts in 1993, 
1999 and 2005 
 
Companies with sales 
above € 1 million had 
to reduce prices by 
7% (2004) 
PPRS: Agreement 
with industry on 
profit control 
 
PPRS is set every 
five years (last 
2005) 
 
Members of the 
PPRS: return on 
capital target of 21% 
(2005) 
 
Currently arguments 
on substituting 
PPRS with a more 
efficient system 
Germany 
Price freedom for new 
products since 1989 
 
Sickness funds negotiate 
discounts for products 
with manufacturers (since 
April 2007) 
Reference price for off- 
patent sector 
 
Two negative lists 
 
Therapeutic reference 
pricing 
 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis and maximum 
reimbursement prices 
(not implemented yet) 
1993, 1994, between 
2002 and 2004 and 
between 2005 and 
March 2008 
manufacturer were 
obliged to hand over 
price increases to the 
SHI as a rebate 
 
Discount on generics 
of 10% for sickness 
funds (2006) 
 
Netherlands 
Free pricing for OTC 
products 
 
Price control since 1996 
for POMs 
 
Maximum wholesale 
price list redetermined 
twice a year 
 
Average pricing with 
external reference: 
Germany, Belgium, 
United Kingdom and 
France 
 
Generic prices have to be 
40% lower than branded 
drugs (2004) 
Since 1991 Reference 
Price System has been 
in use with therapeutic 
reference pricing 
 
Positive list 
 
Promotion of 
dispensing parallel 
imports 
 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis in use 
 
Preference Policy 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
Price freeze and cuts: 
Off-patent product’s 
prices decline 10% 
(2008) 
 
Branded and generics 
prices decline 50% if 
patent expired in 2008 
(2008) 
 
Sweden 
Since 2002 Pricing and 
Reimbursement have 
been combined 
 
Free pricing subject to a 
basket of countries 
 
Use of CEA 
(reimbursement issue) 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis for 
reimbursement issues 
 
Consumer based 
reimbursement rates 
 
Positive lists for POMs 
 
Reimbursement rate is 
100% if patient’s 
pharmaceutical 
expenses per annum 
are above € 463 
Price-Volume 
agreement for 
innovative products 
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Country Price control Reimbursement 
Control of 
Expenditure 
Industrial 
Regulation 
France 
Ex-factory prices 
are fixed through 
negotiations 
 
Negotiations 
between CESP 
and industry 
 
Agreements hold 
for four years 
(latest agreement 
in 2007) 
 
Internal reference 
pricing 
 
Periodic price 
reduction for new 
and expensive 
products 
Comite Economique du 
medicament decides on 
reimbursable prices 
 
“Comite” decides on advice 
from Transparency 
Committee 
 
Positive list 
 
Generics need to be half the 
price of the original product 
for a positive reimbursement 
decision without delay 
(2006) 
 
Medical references 
 
Reference Price System 
since 2003 with only 153 
generic groups 
Negotiations include 
price-volume 
agreement 
 
Payback clause if the 
agreed-upon sales 
target is exceeded 
 
Contract is renewed 
every four years 
 
Denmark 
No price regulation 
 
Price agreements 
between the 
industry and the 
Ministry of Health 
 
Pharmacy mark-up 
fixed 
 
Last agreement in 
January 2007 
(valid for two 
years) 
 
Wholesale 
margins are 
negotiated 
between producer 
and pharmacies 
Positive list 
 
2000-2005 RPS through 
average external reference 
pricing 
 
Reimbursement rate based 
on consumption per annum 
since 2005 
 
Reference Pricing for 
“analogous” 
 
Non compulsory cost-
effectiveness analysis (since 
2005) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author compilation from: PPRI Reports (2006, 2007, 2008), Espin 
and Rovira (2007), Kanavos, Font and Mcguire (2007) 
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Table 8: Overview on demand-side regulations in six EU countries, 2007 
Country Physicians Patients Pharmacies 
United 
Kingdom 
Department of Health 
publishes prescribing targets 
and guidelines 
 
Voluntary generic prescribing 
 
NHS published 
recommendation lists 
 
NICE advices on cost-
effectiveness 
 
Computerized monitoring and 
decision support 
 
Quality and Outcomes 
Framework rewards 
physicians with good 
performance 
 
Pharmaceutical budget in 
place 
Standard prescription fee of 
GBP 6.65 per item 
 
Information about 
pharmaceuticals is given 
through the NHS 
No generic substitution allowed 
 
Vertical mergers or partnerships are 
allowed 
 
Agreement on margins and targets 
 
Remuneration through service fees, 
allowances and margin won from 
the price difference of products and 
the reimbursement rate 
 
Claw-back in place as a deduction 
of reimbursement (average 
deduction rate is about 10%) 
 
 
Germany 
Negotiated targets on cost 
control and appropriate 
prescription through guidelines 
(since 2002) 
 
If overprescribe is more than 
25% and justification is 
rejected, physicians need to 
pay back 
 
Monitoring, information and 
education schemes are 
installed in Germany 
Co-payment varies with the 
price of the reimbursed product. 
Fixed fees and percentage 
payments are possible (since 
2003) 
 
VAT raised from 16%  to 19% 
(2007) 
Mark-up scheme is regulated 
 
Fixed fee and linear mark-up for 
POMs and regressive Mark-up for 
OTC products 
 
Remuneration of € 8.10 per 
package and a fixed mark-up of 3% 
on the wholesaler price for any 
prescribed drug (since 2004) 
 
Voluntary generic substitution 
(since 2002) 
Netherlands 
Encouraged to prescribe 
therapeutically and cost 
effective pharmaceuticals 
 
Preference Policy influences 
physicians (since 2008) 
 
Electronic prescription system 
 
Capitation fee per year 
 
Insurance funds give financial 
incentives 
 
Physicians should inform 
patients about the value of 
generics 
Residents need to take out a 
health insurance (since 2006) 
 
Educated and informed through 
institutions and insurances 
 
Co-payment is just in the case if 
the reference price is lower than 
the product’s price 
 
 
 
 
 
Except in certain cases generic 
substitution is obligatory (since 
2004) 
 
Generic substitution was voluntary 
(2002-2004) 
 
Financial incentives to dispense 
cheaper substitutes 
 
Claw-back refers to pharmacy drug 
purchase costs (1998)  
 
6.82% discount and € 6.80 per 
dispensed prescription (2002) 
 
Between December 2007 and July 
2008 claw-back rate was 11.3% 
Sweden 
Monitoring of prescribing and 
medicines 
 
Pharmaceutical budgets 
implemented 
 
Guidelines available through a 
code for non-binding 
information and help - 
Physicians encouraged to 
prescribe generics 
Authorities try to inform patients 
about prices, reimbursement 
and recommended dosage, 
contraindications, side effects 
etc. through homepages 
 
Co-payment is the difference 
from the reimbursement rate 
and depends on the yearly 
consumption of the patient 
Government has a monopoly on 
dispensing pharmaceuticals (until 
January 2009) 
 
Generic substitution is mandatory 
(since 2002) 
 
Margin consists of a flat rate per 
prescription and on a fee which 
depends on the price of the pack 
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Country Physicians Patients Pharmacies 
France 
No prescription budgets 
and no prescription 
quotas 
 
Since 2007 physicians 
are able to follow their 
prescription profile on 
web sites 
 
No financial incentives for 
cost-aware prescribing 
 
High Authority of Health 
has been publishing 
guidelines since 2004 – 
15% generic prescribing 
 
Encouraged to prescribe 
generics 
Co-payment percentage wise 
 
Co-payment includes € 0.53 for 
each pharmaceutical (also 
reimbursed at that rate) 
 
Maximum out-of-pocket payment 
(OPP) is € 50 per year 
 
€ 1 flat fee for consultations 
Different fixed margins for 
different pharmaceutical prices 
 
Financial incentive to dispense 
the cheapest product 
 
Optional generic substitution 
(since 1999) 
Denmark 
Guidance with 
recommendations, info 
and advices non-binding 
 
Computerized monitoring 
named ORDIPRAX and 
accessible for physicians 
 
Generic prescribing not 
allowed 
Information available through the 
Danish Medicines Agency 
(DKMA) 
 
Internet platform available 
 
Out-of-pocket payment fixed and 
percentage based 
 
Flat dispensing fee of € 1.34 
 
Percentage co-payment: 
Difference of the rate of 
reimbursement and 100% 
Mark-up scheme is linear  
(since April 2007) 
 
Voluntary generic substitution 
(1991-1997) 
 
Obligatory generic substitution 
(since 1997) 
 
No claw-backs 
 
 
Source: Author compilation from: PPRI Reports (2006, 2007, 2008), Espin 
and Rovira (2007), Kanavos, Font and Mcguire (2007) 
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III.6 Regulation in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is known for its complex and unique system of pricing 
and reimbursement among the European Union states. Its reputation is 
based on the regulations focussing more on the demand side than on the 
supply side incentives and on measures the special way of indirect price 
control20. 
 
III.6.1 Supply Side 
The United Kingdom has a unique way of pricing pharmaceutical products. 
The decisions on pricing and reimbursement are not separate and combined 
to a simple process. Once the National Health Service (NHS) list price of a 
particular branded pharmaceutical has been set, it is consequently 
reimbursed at the same price 21 . All prescription prices are regulated 
indirectly, the branded pharmaceuticals by the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS) and generics by the Drug Tariff (DT). 
 
 III.6.1.1 PPRS and Branded Pharmaceuticals 
Licensed, branded prescription medicines in the UK follow a relative pricing 
freedom for medicines when launched. But prices are indirectly controlled 
through industrial regulations. This implements that company profits gained 
by sales to the NHS are regulated. This is done by the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS) on the basis of a negotiated target for the rate of 
return on capital22. This voluntary scheme is negotiated every five years 
between the Department of Health and the pharmaceutical industry23.  
 
PPRS´ goal is to provide safe and effective medicines to the NHS at 
reasonable prices, encourage the efficient and competitive supply of 
pharmaceuticals to the pharmaceutical market and to promote a strong and 
profitable pharmaceutical industry so that research and development leads to 
more new treatments in the future24.  
                                                 
20
 Chapter based on an author compilation from: PPRI Reports (2006, 2007, 2008), Department of 
Health (2005, 2006), Espin and Rovira (2007), OFT (2007), Kanavos, Font and Mcguire (2007) 
21
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 50 
22
 Kanavos, Font and Mcguire 2007, p. 458 
23
 Kanavos, Font and Mcguire 2007, p. 458 
24
 Department of Health (2005), Summary of the PPRS 2005, p. 1, 
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The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme includes two main 
components. First it sets profit controls that apply to all the branded products 
which are sold by a manufacturer to the NHS and secondly it provides price 
controls that allow companies freedom to set an initial price for new 
substances25. If companies choose not to sign the scheme, profit controls 
and statutory prices are installed. This threat was set by the Health Act in 
1999 26 . Obviously a lot of information is necessary to employ those 
measures. Hence a permanent update of pricing and capital data and 
information exchange between companies and authorities is obligatory.  
 
In negotiations industry and the Department of Health agree on profit targets 
of the scheme (PPRS). Unique in Europe is that this system applies for 
individual companies rather than specific products. If a company exceeds the 
agreed profit target, it has either to reduce its price for the product or make a 
repayment to the Department of Health. Hence the UK had price cuts in 
1993, 1999 and 2005 on all branded products27. In succession to the 1999 
scheme a new PPRS was commenced 28  and companies with sales of 
branded pharmaceuticals to the NHS above £1 million in 2004 were required 
to reduce prices by 7%29. In 2005 negotiations included that “all scheme 
members will have a common Return on Capital target of 21%” 30 . The 
scheme also includes regulations on promotion costs, research and 
development expenses and a margin of tolerance on either site of the profit 
(rate of return) target. 
 
 III.6.1.2 Drug Tariff and Generics 
Because of increasing prices of generics, the Department of Health reacted 
by introducing commissioning the Oxford Economic Research Associates 
                                                 
25
 http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/market-studies/completed/price-
regulation 
26
 PPRI Report United Kingdom 2007, p. 43 
27
 PPRI Report United Kingdom 2007, p. 35 
28
 PPRS Report United Kingdom 2007, p. 27 
29
 Department of Health (2005), Summary of the PPRS 2005, p. 2 
30
 Department of Health (2005), Summary of the PPRS 2005, p. 2 
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(OXERA) to analyse long-term possibilities to regulate prices and supply of 
generics and by implementing a Maximum Price Scheme in August 200031. 
 
In April 2005 the Department replaced the Maximum Price Scheme and 
introduced a long-term arrangement for reimbursement of generics. The DH 
introduced two voluntary scheme, namely M for manufacturers and W for 
wholesalers. To qualify for reimbursement generics producers have to adapt 
to either agreements of negotiations or calculations by the Department of 
Health. The reimbursement prices are summarized and published in the Drug 
Tariff (DT) every month 32 . The DT subdivides the generics in three 
categories, namely M, A and C33. M medicines´ reimbursement prices are set 
quarterly based on manufacturers´ prices after deduction. It covers 84% by 
net ingredient cost of generics reimbursed in the NHS 34 . The prices of 
category A are based on list prices of a basket of two main full-line 
wholesalers and three manufacturers. The category C is not instantly 
available and their reimbursement prices are orientated on a manufacturer or 
a special brand35. 
 
 III.6.1.3 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
In 1999 the United Kingdom implemented the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 36 . The institute produces independent 
professional guidance on public health, health technology and clinical 
practice. This guidance explains whether a pharmaceutical should be 
included in the NHS or not and gives recommendations about the 
pharmaceuticals. These recommendations are usually reviewed after five 
years.  
 
NICE does not decide alone which medicines should be guided. The Institute 
undertakes appraisals as formally requested by the Department of Health 
(DH) or individual manufacturers that can suggest pharmaceuticals to be 
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guided if they are not in the list of the NHS. NICE reviews each suggestion 
received and filters it with the “selection criteria” form, which latest version 
was developed in June 2006 by the Department of Health.  The prioritizing 
assessment in the UK to choose topics is therefore based on the following 
criteria37: 
 
• Burden of disease 
• Resource impact, i.e. the costs for the NHS and the public sector 
• Policy importance 
• Inappropriate variation in use across the country 
• Factors which affect the urgency for guidance to be produced 
 
Once the topics are accepted the pharmaceuticals and treatments are guided 
by NICE. Among the guidelines health technology is especially important for 
the NHS because the technology appraisal by NICE are recommendations 
on the use of old and new medicines within the NHS. The recommendations 
are based on clinical and economic evidence. Clinical evidence measures 
how well medicines or treatments change the health status of patients. 
Economic evidence evaluates how effective the medicine is in relation to how 
much it costs the NHS. In assessment of clinical and cost effectiveness NICE 
evaluates health economic analyses and produces Quality Adjusted Life Year 
data. On this data recommendations are based. The PPRI report from 2007 
summarizes that NICE has indicated that the threshold cost per QALY is in 
between twenty and thirty thousand pounds38. However, other factors might 
also be taken into account39.  
 
Because of criticism about delays in the process of appraisals and choosing 
topics NICE has introduced a new “single technology appraisal”, a rapid 
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 Department of Health (2006), Selection criteria for referral of topics by NICE 2006, p. 1-3, 
available on http://www.nice.org.uk/niceMedia/pdf/DH_selection_criteria_July_06.pdf 
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process for assessing drugs, in 2007. The institution should produce 
guidance more rapidly on life-saving pharmaceuticals and treatments that 
have already been licensed and other new medicines that have just become 
available. 
 
 III.6.1.4 Reforming the PPRS: The Office of Fair Trade report (OFT) 
Discussions concerning replacement for the PPRS have been around since a 
report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has been published in February 
2007. In this report, “The Pharmaceutical Price and Regulation Scheme”, the 
OFT argues that the current price and profit control done by the PPRS should 
be replaced with a value-based approach to pricing. The reason for this 
recommendation is the missing connection between “clinical and therapeutic 
value to patients” 40  within the PPRS. Even though there are cost 
measurements by NICE in the UK at the moment; critics blame it to be unfair 
for patients because its decisions are inevitable based on the limited 
resources of the NHS and do not focus on the patients demand41. 
 
The OFT believes that new reforms would increase patients´ benefits and 
create incentives for companies to research and develop in innovative areas.  
 
The first reform suggested by the OFT would be an ex post value-based 
pricing42. Pricing freedom for new substances would retain, but profit controls 
and price regulations would be replaced by ex post cost effectiveness 
reviews. These reviews would set a maximum price according to the clinical 
benefits relative to competitors43. This is different from the time where the 
NHS had set reimbursement prices and negotiates with the industries about 
the prices and the profits of manufacturers in one step.  
 
The second option for a reform suggested by the OFT would be an ex ante 
value-based pricing44. In this case price and profit controls would also be 
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replaced in the same way. Added to the mentioned ex-post review would be 
an ex ante approach to set an appropriate maximum price and a decision 
over reimbursement. That way a separation of price and reimbursement 
decision like in most European countries should be implemented. To decline 
the chance of extended negotiation processes a facility to assess cost-
effectiveness further down the line should allow an early rapid look at the 
situation.  
 
The OFT believes that these two ideas for a new system would increase cost 
effectiveness, set better incentives for companies to invest in 
pharmaceuticals that are useful for society and treatment and build a base of 
a more stable and sustainable system45. 
 
 III.6.1.5 Negative List and Reference Price System 
For reimbursement purposes the United Kingdom carries a negative list46. 
For branded pharmaceuticals under the PPRS reimbursement rates is set by 
the price of the manufacturer plus the wholesale mark-up. So there are no 
restrictions in place for what can be reimbursed and what not. But there are 
restrictions for what can be prescribed and only these products are fully 
reimbursed. This is regulated through economic analyses by an independent 
institution named NICE since 1999. Almost all OTC products and 
pharmaceuticals prescribed by a private physician are not reimbursed. A 
typical reference price system is not in place in the UK47. 
 
III.6.2 Demand Side 
The UK is known for regulations focusing more on the demand side than the 
supply side. Here physicians, pharmacies and patients are encouraged and 
partly obliged to be cost-aware and efficient. 
 
III.6.2.1 Physicians 
The Department of Health has spent millions to support reasonable use of 
pharmaceuticals and indications for rational prescriptions. Therefore the DH 
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publishes targets to guide and to offer incentives to local NHS activity on 
General Practioners (GP). As an example: In England pharmacists are only 
encouraged by recommendations and guidelines, but not obliged, to hand out 
prescriptions for generics instead of branded pharmaceuticals “for both 
clinical and cost reasons, when appropriate”48. 
 
The local NHS publishes local formularies or lists of recommended drugs 
which they consider useful to meet clinical needs of their resident 
populations. Here cost-effectiveness is also considered. Physicians are not 
obliged to follow these formularies, but they could be asked to justify 
prescriptions outside the list. In addition the NHS has now more than 1,200 
advisers, who are mainly pharmacists, that publish reviews and undertake 
private reviews with General Practitioners49. 
 
Physicians can also get information and should be familiar with the guidance 
by the independent institution NICE whose assessments include clinical and 
cost effectiveness50 . NICE runs diverse economic analyzing methods on 
which the institution bases its recommendations of use and prescription to 
physicians and to the NHS51. 
 
The NHS collects and collates a large amount of prescribing data. This is 
made available to physicians and advisers through computerized systems. 
Part of this system is a computerized decision support system named 
“Electronic Prescribing and Financial Information for Practices” (ePFIP) which 
helps physicians to find appropriate generics and products for treatment52. 
The prescription patterns and the expenditure profiles of physicians are 
monitored by NICE. Still there are no concrete sanctions on over-spending in 
place.  
 
Financial incentives are not given by the recommendations and electronic 
systems but by the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). This is a 
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contract that resources General Practitioners for their quality of patient care 
and not for the number of patients medicated. Payments are annually. Some 
of the local NHS groups also run prescribing incentive schemes to reward 
cost-awareness and clinically appropriate prescribing. 
 
Another financial factor, which influences prescriptions, is pharmaceutical 
budgeting. The local NHS, or the Primary Care Trusts, determines every year 
an overall budget. Prescribing advisers help the Primary Care Trusts to set 
budgetary constraints for local areas. 
 
III.6.2.3 Patients 
Patients face a fixed fee arrangement in the UK. They have to spend a 
standard fee of GBP 6.65 per item prescribed. For some patients there might 
be exemptions. They depend on the method of delivery, medication types, 
age and financial situation of the patient and on his health status. Percentage 
related co-payment agreements are not in place in England.  
 
III.6.2.4 Pharmacies 
Prescription-only-medicines (POMs) are usually dispensed from a registered 
pharmacy. Pharmacists are not aloud to substitute prescribed branded 
pharmaceuticals through generics. They need to dispense the brand if that is 
what has been written on the prescription by the pharmacist. 
 
There are approximately 11,500 community pharmacy outlets in Great 
Britain. There are some restrictions on ownership of community pharmacies. 
A pharmacy has to be registered and owned by a pharmacist or a partnership 
of two or more pharmacists. A pharmacist partnership can own an unlimited 
number of pharmacies which leads to an interesting allocation of community 
pharmacy owners. It consists of large and medium sized chains. Vertical 
partnerships or mergers are allowed in the UK. This implies that wholesalers 
and drug manufacturers can also own pharmacies. Due to their ownership 
these manufacturers are able to absorb all potential discounts that usually 
are given to pharmacies.  
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There is no minimum distance between pharmacies or other legal controls 
over the location of pharmacies. But still pharmacies that wish to provide 
state funded NHS pharmaceutical services must apply and follow a “control 
of entry” law. 
 
Remuneration is provided by the contractual framework for community 
pharmacies 53 . This framework includes service fee remuneration and a 
remuneration target depending on the patient and the region. The actual 
rates are a result of negotiations with the Pharmaceutical Services 
Negotiating Committee and authorities. The pharmacies are paid via fees 
and allowances, payments for specific services and the margin won on the 
difference between reimbursement prices and the initial price that was 
actually paid for the pharmaceutical. Hence margins of the pharmacies are 
monitored through invoices. If these deviate from the target, which was set in 
the contractual framework, reimbursement prices for generic medicines are 
adjusted correspondingly54. 
 
Claw-backs are not explicitly part of the UK health system. Pharmacies can 
have an amount deducted from their reimbursement if they exceed agreed 
targets. This deduction varies depending on the size of the pharmacy. The 
average deduction rate is around ten percent. 
 
III.7 Regulation in Germany 
The German reimbursement, pricing and system for pharmaceuticals is not 
only one of the oldest ones in Europe but it is also one of the most 
complicated and comprehensive ones. Funny enough it tries to combine the 
freedom of pricing for pharmaceutical manufactures with a whole set of 
indirect and direct price control measures. In recent years and especially 
after the latest mayor health care reform, which became effective on the first 
of April 2007 it also uses the competition and the negotiating power of 
sickness funds to regulate prices55. 
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III.7.1 Supply side 
Generally speaking the price policy of pharmaceutical manufactures is not 
confronted with many regulations. However German health policy employs a 
large number of indirect price control mechanisms, some are more directed 
to the supply side, e.g., co-payments and deductibles, negative lists and drug 
budgets for office based physicians, others are directed to supply side as the 
famous reference pricing scheme, and the recently introduced maximum 
reimbursement prices and negotiated reimbursement prices as well as fixed 
mark ups for pharmacies and regulated discounts to sickness funds. 
 
 III.7.1.1 Pricing Freedom and Reimbursement 
The actual pricing and reimbursement system in Germany was established in 
1989. After a product has been licensed by the German Food and Drug 
Administration (Bundesamt für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte BfArM) the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer can launch the product at any price it wants to. 
It will also be reimbursed by the statutory sickness funds. Patients only have 
to cover out-of pocket payments reported in the table below (see B 2.2.). 
However the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Budnesausschuss 
GBA) will audit the cost and benefit profile of the drug. If the drug is 
considered as a treatment for trifling diseases or as a life style drug – like 
Viagra – it will be set by the GBA on a negative list. By this it is excluded from 
reimbursement.  
 
For all other drugs the GBA will explore the question if the new drug can be 
included in a reference price group. 
 
Some products among the licensed pharmaceuticals are excluded from 
normal reimbursement shown in Figure B1 and are covered by a reference 
pricing system. Here the pricing freedom for branded pharmaceuticals is 
indirectly narrowed through reference pricing as soon as the branded product 
goes off-patent56. Up to the end of 2003 only pharmaceuticals where the 
patent protection had expired, were covered by the reference pricing 
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scheme. Since 2004 patent drugs can also be put into reference price groups 
which may contain generics as well as patent drugs (mixed groups are called 
jumbo groups) and have to contain at least three drugs. Basically the GBA, 
which is the most important body in the German health care system and 
which contains delegates of the sickness funds, physicians, hospitals and 
patients, clusters the medicines in pharmaceutical groups which either have 
the same active ingredient (generics), or are based on therapeutically and 
pharmacologically comparable active ingredients or are considered as 
therapeutically and pharmacologically comparable pharmaceuticals with 
different active ingredients57. The GBA calculates the prices for a daily dose 
for the drugs in a reference price group following a quite complicated and 
little transparent procedure58: 
 
• Generics: Reference price of a standard pack must not exceed the 
highest price in the lowest third of the reference group 
 
• Pharmacologically or therapeutically comparable ingredient 
 
• Pharmaceuticals with a similar impact or treatment but different active 
ingredients  
 
Unlike Germany, in most European countries clustering is restricted to 
generic medicines only. This way of therapeutic and not just generic 
clustering was unique in Europe when it was implemented by the Health 
Care Reform Act in 1989. Germany’s reference pricing system has no 
schedule of external price reference even this procedure is used in many 
European countries. The only procedure to monitor prices and to refer in 
Germany is an internal reference procedure. It needs to be said that 
Germany’s reference of prices is not for price mechanisms or price controls. 
It is just to evaluate the reference price rate for reimbursement. 
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Advocates of reference pricing schemes argue that it allows insurance 
companies and patients to choose between therapeutically similar products 
without any concern on the cost or price59. 
 
Products that are not part of the three groups, can stick to free-pricing until 
their patent expires. Before the patent of a product expires no price control 
holds for all pharmaceuticals. Hospitals negotiate their prices directly with the 
manufacturer, so in that case their pricing is not controlled60. 
 
Since April 2007 the GBA can also give the order to the independent Institute 
for Quality and Efficiency in Medical Care (Institut für Qualität und 
Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) to conduct a cost-benefit 
evaluation for drugs. The results of these evaluations are taken to set 
maximum reimbursement prices for pharmaceuticals. It is the obligation of 
the Federal Association of Sickness Funds (Spitzenverband Bund 
Krankenkassen, SpiBu) to set those prices. Because the SpiBu is a newly 
founded organization which stated working in July 2008 and the IQWiG is still 
in the process of defining the methodological guidelines for economic 
evaluations, no maximum reimbursement prices have been set yet. In 
addition, since April 2007 sickness funds may negotiate discounts for drugs 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers. If a discount contract is in place, 
pharmacies have to provide the medicine with a discount, if it is a close 
substitute to a pharmaceutical prescribed by a physician. There is little public 
information on the discount contracts being in place at the moment. However, 
most of the sickness funds have used this option to put price pressure on the 
manufacturers. 
 
Since April 2003 sickness funds have been receiving from the pharmacies for 
prescribed pharmaceuticals a discount of € 2.30 per products. For all other 
medications they have been receiving 5% of the prices. In addition the 
sickness funds receive a discount of 6% of the prices. 
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Because of the rising health expenditure competition between sickness funds 
was introduced in the 1990s. There are numerous temporary regulatory 
measures taken to influence pharmaceutical prices. For example in 2006 it 
implemented an obligatory discount for generics of 10% for sickness funds to 
keep the prices unchanged61. This increased the market share of generics 
tremendously. Also in 1993, 1994, between 2002 and 2004 and between 
2005 and March 2008 manufacturers were obliged to hand out the amount of 
price increases of medicines compared to the old price to Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) as a rebate. 
 
III.7.2 Demand side 
The demand side is more regulated and especially physicians need to deal 
with many regulations. 
 
III.7.2.1 Physicians 
Germany does not have strong but compulsory prescription guidelines. There 
are non-binding and binding guidelines. The non-binding guidelines refer 
more to prescribing drugs and less to restrictions about specific drugs62. 
However, efficiency checks for physicians are in use. These controls are 
based on the number of prescriptions and the value of sickness funds´ 
reclaims of individual physicians. 
 
In Germany there are many prescription guidelines by various organizations. 
However none of them are binding for physicians. Sickness funds can 
demand for an efficiency audit. In this case physicians have to explain, why 
they have explained certain pharmaceuticals. As sickness funds are mostly 
interested in cost-containment they only ask for an audit, if physicians 
prescribe significantly more than the so called Guideline Value (Richtgröße). 
The Guideline Value is a physician type specific value in € per treated patient 
which is negotiated between the sickness funds and the insurance doctors 
associations on a state level. 
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Even though there are some incentives to prescribe generics like 
pharmaceutical budgeting for doctors who are under contract with the 
sickness funds, the restrictions are too general to consider these as binding 
prescription guidelines for generic prescribing or as compulsory prescription 
quotas 63 . Pharmaceutical budgets of varying strictness with regional 
spending caps were used in Germany till 2002. Since 2002 it is regulated 
through negotiation based on targets of cost-control and appropriate 
prescriptions.  The negotiations take place between self-governmental 
partners. If physicians tend to over-prescribe by being 15% above the 
recommended target they are first informed by a letter and to reconsider their 
decisions. If they exceed the target by 25% they need to justify their 
behaviour. If this justification is rejected physicians are obliged to payback 
the difference of their sales and the 115% of the target to sickness funds. 
Since 2007 for highly priced pharmaceuticals a cap on average prescription 
costs was introduced. That way targets for areas are calculated. If a 
physician exceeds the revenue target by more then 10% he is forced to 
reimburse the deficit. 
 
III.7.2.2 Patients 
At the moment the reimbursement of the sickness funds employs various co-
payments. Products that cost less than € 100 follow the prices and the 
corresponding co-payment rates shown in Figure C.1. For drugs with prices 
higher € 100 the patient has to pay a flat rate of € 10: 
 
Price of drug Co-payment rate Reimbursement rate 
€ 0 - € 5 100 % 0 % 
€ 5 - € 50 Flat rate € 5 0 % – 90 % 
€ 50 - € 100 10 % 90 % 
above € 100 Flat rate € 10 over 90 % 
 
Financially weak sickness fund members and people under 18 years are 
excluded from co-payment. If a patient can prove that the overall co-
payments for health care (including co-payment in other areas then drug use, 
e.g., hospital stays) per year exceed 1% of their gross income the get full 
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coverage over that cap of 1%. This system was introduces in 2003. Before 
2003 co-payments were set according to the package size.  
 
In Germany pharmaceuticals are not exempt from standard rate value added 
tax (VAT). VAT is quite high in Germany compared to most other European 
countries. The standard and the pharmaceutical VAT rate was raised from 
16% to 19% in 2007 for all prescription subscribers. 
 
III.7.2.3 Pharmacies 
German marks up schemes change for different pharmaceuticals64. The two 
different pharmaceuticals are in this case the prescription-only-medicines 
(POMs) and the over-the-counter products (OTCs). Although regulated 
margins for wholesales or just for singular pharmacies refer to each other, 
the law distinguishes between the two with different mark up schemes for the 
wholesale and pharmacy mark up. In the case of wholesalers the POM have 
a regressive mark-up scheme and in the case of pharmacy mark up, 
pharmacies are forced to follow a fixed fee and linear mark-up. The over-the 
counter products follow in both cases a regressive mark up scheme. 
 
Until 2004 pharmacies received a regressive mark up on the manufacturer 
price. The percentage varied from 12% to 21 % depending on the price of the 
drug. Pharmacies´ remuneration was changed in 2004. Since then they are 
paid with a flat-fee of € 8.10 per package and a fixed mark-up of 3% on the 
wholesaler price for any prescribed drug65. For calculations the VAT of 19 % 
is excluded. This is supposed to be paid by the customer being the sickness 
funds in most cases. 
  
Since February 2002 it is allowed and recommended for pharmacists to 
substitute branded pharmaceuticals with generics, unless it is explicitly 
prohibited by the doctors66. This law was part of the Law for Reduction of 
Drug Related Costs in Healthcare67. 
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Dispensing physicians are not allowed in Germany. Pharmacies have 
basically a monopoly on drugs68. However, internet pharmacies have already 
taken over a 4 % of the pharmaceutical market in Germany. Even the same 
regulations hold for these as for other pharmacies international competition 
within Europe increases competition and import ratios of pharmaceuticals by 
patients. 
 
III.8 Regulation in the Netherlands 
The Dutch government has tried to ration supply and demand in the last thirty 
years69. But due to the complex structure of this sector it has not been able to 
effectively allot supply. That is why many instruments have been 
implemented aiming at a control of prices of pharmaceuticals. In addition they 
intend with quite strict demand side regulations to stimulate physicians, 
pharmacists and patients for cost-consciousness and efficiency70. 
 
III.8.1 Supply side 
The supply side faces one of the oldest and fairly strict external referencing 
pricing and reimbursement systems in Europe. 
 
III.8.1.1 Price Regulation 
Except for OTC products´ prices, which are not regulated, the Netherlands 
controls prices directly and uses price caps and methods to adjust prices to 
international standards. These methods focus on reducing health care 
system costs. The pricing system was introduced in 1996. POMs, generics 
and branded, that are purchased by pharmacies are all subject to the 
Medicine Price Act. This act lists all the maximum wholesale prices of 
prescription-only medicines. The list prices are redetermined twice a year. 
The maximum level is calculated through therapeutic reference pricing as the 
average price of all pharmaceuticals that are either generics (same active 
substance), pharmaceuticals with the same strength or have a similar 
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pharmaceutical dosage form in the countries Germany, Belgium, United 
Kingdom and France71. Since 2000 the determined average European price 
gives equal weight to all comparable medicines. Since 2004 generic prices 
have to be at least 40% lower than the price of the original product72. 
 
In 2004 and 2005 authorities tried to react with price cuts and freezes to 
increase generic´s share in the pharmaceutical market. A convent in 2004 
decided to decrease the wholesale prices of generics by an average of 40%. 
A convent in 2005 decided that the prices of branded pharmaceuticals for 
which generics are available should decrease by an average of 40%.  
 
In September 2007 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, insurer, industry 
and pharmacists have agreed on the so called “Transition Agreement”. It 
includes that the industry’s prices of off-patent branded pharmaceuticals and 
generics will decline by 10% on average in 2008. All the pharmaceuticals 
whose patent expires in 2008 and their generics will have a price cut by 50% 
compared to the ex ante branded pharmaceutical. 
 
 III.8.1.2 Reimbursement and Reference Pricing 
Since 1991 the Netherlands have been using reference pricing for 
reimbursement, but the current reimbursement system stems from a reform 
in 1989. Reimbursable pharmaceuticals are categorised into three groups, as 
follows.  
 
The first category forms therapeutically equivalent pharmaceuticals. For 
these reimbursement is according to a reference price system. Reference 
reimbursement prices are set by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport for 
all pharmaceuticals. Reimbursable pharmaceuticals are listed on a positive 
list. As in Germany the regulations and clustering does not only include 
generics but also in-patent pharmaceuticals. The system clusters groups with 
“mostly similar indications, routes of administration, targeted age groups and 
for which no clinically relevant difference in outcomes apply”73. The reference 
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price is valued using the cost of the DDD (defined daily dose) for each 
pharmaceutical in the group. The reimbursement level is determined from 
each group’s weighted average prices. Pharmaceuticals that are priced 
higher than the reference price are only partly reimbursed. Reference Pricing 
applies to all products. Excluded are only the pharmaceuticals which cannot 
be grouped into the clusters mentioned74. 
 
All the products that were introduced after 1999 had and have the opportunity 
to get a premium price if the producer can show cost-effective medications 
and added therapeutic value. If they do they are part of a second category. 
Their reimbursement does not depend on reference pricing. It adapts to the 
retail price so there are no reimbursement limits. As soon as there is also a 
second product with the same therapeutically effect, the price of the first 
product is the reimbursement limit of the whole cluster in which these two 
and any following therapeutically similar product is placed in.  
 
The last category includes pharmaceuticals that are reimbursed under 
specific circumstances. 
 
Since 2008, healthcare insurers have been working with a joint and individual 
preference policy. With this new policy insurers can reimburse the cheapest 
off-patent pharmaceutical if an off-patent pharmaceutical was prescribed. All 
medication labels within a range at 5% above the price of the cheapest label 
is then designated as the preferred product. Any product that is outside this 
range is not reimbursable75. 
 
III.8.2 Demand side 
The Netherlands have implemented many regulations since 2002 to regulate 
the demand side and tried to achieve cost-effective handling of the 
pharmaceutical market through the demand side. The latest regulation is the 
implemented “preference policy” which intends to enhance efficient 
prescribing behavior. 
 
                                                 
74
 Espin and Rovira 2007, p. 91 
75
 Press Release OPG May 2008, p. 3 
 51 
 III.8.2.1 Physicians 
Physicians are encouraged in many ways to prescribe therapeutically and 
cost effective pharmaceuticals like generics. Regularly prescription 
guidelines, experience reports and treatment protocols are published by 
authorities for GPs. Still there are no objectives for prescription of medicines 
by individual physicians. Some insurance funds offer financial incentives to 
physicians for prescribing generics and especially efficient prescription of 
statins and Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPIs). Physicians are indirectly also 
influenced by the “preference policy” from 2008, which enables insurances to 
reimburse the lowest-priced generic when any generic or an off-patent 
branded pharmaceutical has been prescribed. One electronic prescription 
system was also tested in experiments but the results showed that even 
there was a 70% high usage of the system the cost saving effects for the 
health care system were minimal76. 
 
Regional pharmacotherapeutic platforms have been installed to support and 
advise physicians and pharmacists about efficient prescribing practices77.  
 
Physicians get a poll tax fee per year from publicly insured patients even 
without any consultation. If patients are privately insured physicians or GPs 
usually charge a yearly fixed tariff for consultation in which all expenses for 
prescriptions are included. If it comes to more prescriptions, without any 
consultation, the tariff decreases to 50%. 
  
III.8.2.2 Patients 
Patients are informed and educated through institutions and insurances. 
These try to make the patients cost-conscious. The Dutch Health Care 
Insurance Board has launched a website with information on retail prices, co-
payment and availability of generics or other cheaper alternatives. 
 
In general there is no co-payment regulation in the Netherlands. However, if 
the price of the medication exceeds the reference price, the product is just 
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reimbursed to a certain degree. The patients need to pay the rest of the 
price78. 
 
Since 2006 all residents of the Netherlands have to sign into a health 
insurance. Still they can choose among insurances. The insurances are all 
obliged to offer a standard package. This package includes most necessary 
treatments from a visit to the physician to a hospital admission as well as 
prescription fees79. 
 
III.8.2.3 Pharmacies 
If a prescription is not listed by an international non-proprietary name (İNN), a 
pharmacy has the opportunity to substitute more expensive prescribed 
pharmaceuticals with cheaper generics. If the physician does not mention the 
active ingredient but instead the brand name of the branded pharmaceutical 
then the pharmacy is obliged to dispense exactly as it is written on the 
prescription. 
 
Pharmacists have a financial incentive to dispense generics. If a pharmacist 
sells a product and the price is underneath the list price of the branded 
product, the pharmacy can keep one-third of the price difference. 
Remuneration of pharmacies follows a yearly fixed tariff for each prescription. 
 
In 1998 the Netherlands introduced a claw-back rule. The rule obliged 
pharmacies to transform parts of their sales benefits into a price benefit 
granted to the patients and to the insurances. The discount granted started 
with 2% in 1998 and then rose to 3% for insurers in 1999. In the period 
around 2000 and the end 2002 a new claw-back rule was introduced still 
holds nowadays. The claw-back was increased to 6.82% up to a maximum of 
€ 6.80 per dispensed prescription. The percentage rate of 6.82% was raised 
temporarily to 11.3% from December 2007 until July 200880. 
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III.9 Sweden 
The Swedish health care system has gone through two major reforms in 
2002 and 2006 and has had a time period of five years in which reference 
pricing was implemented. Nowadays it is a system advantaging the status of 
generics in the market and patients with high pharmaceutical expenses81. 
 
III.9.1 Supply Side 
The supply side regulations in Sweden have gone through several reforms in 
the last decades.  Especially the merge of the reimbursement and pricing 
decisions in 2002 and through the switch to a consumption based 
reimbursement system Sweden has made the step to improve the situation 
for older and health care treatment dependent civilians. This way Sweden 
achieved a compared to other countries moderate increase of the 
pharmaceutical expense. 
 
 III.9.1.1 Pricing and Reimbursement 
Sweden implemented a reference price system in f but abolished it after 
nearly a decade (2002) of existence82. Since 2002 up to nowadays, Pricing 
and Reimbursement processes in Sweden have been combined. Only over-
the-counter products follow free pricing and are not reimbursed. The other 
products can request for reimbursement. In that case the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Board (PBB) can approve reimbursement following the aim of the 
system that there should be a rational and cost-effective use of medicines. 
“Sweden made major changes to its reimbursement system in 2002. Earlier 
almost all prescription drugs were automatically approved for reimbursement. 
Today applications are thoroughly scrutinized and cost-effectiveness is a 
crucial decision-making criteria” 83 . Three principles can put together the 
eligibility criteria of the reimbursement system in Sweden, which was laid out 
in the Act on Pharmaceutical Benefits: 
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• Human value principle 
• Need and solidarity principle 
• Cost-effectiveness principle 
 
As there is no direct or separate price control, prices are part of the cost-
effectiveness analysis for reimbursement matters. If the product shows cost-
effectiveness with the given price by the applying company, then the product 
is reimbursed for that price. The prices are set at the wholesale level. 
 
If companies want to change prices of reimbursed products it needs to apply 
for acceptance. Because of time reasons and the aim to increase price 
competition it was established in 2002 that without further investigation 
applied price changes are accepted if they are below or as maximum the 
same as the highest price of all substitutable pharmaceuticals. 
 
After the products have been accepted for reimbursement the scheme is 
quite similar to the one in Denmark. The reimbursement rate is based on the 
consumption of the patient. Reimbursement basically rises with the 
consumption which shows that this is profitable for older and handicapped 
people. The patient needs to pay the full cost of his medication up to a 
threshold of € 97 in a one year period. After passing this the reimbursement 
rate rises gradually and the patient pays (status 2006)84: 
 
• 50% of the costs between € 97 and 183. 
• 75% of the costs between € 183 and 355. 
• 90% of the costs between € 355 and 463. 
• 100% of the costs above € 463. 
 
For newly innovative products price-volume agreements can be 
implemented. 
 
III.9.2 Demand Side 
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The demand side in Sweden has been influenced through the government’s 
monopoly on dispensing pharmaceuticals for many years. Now in 2008 the 
government has published new ideas of restructuring the market and put 
forward ideas to gain free market economy in the pharmacy sector. 
 
III.9.2.1 Physicians 
Sweden faced pharmaceutical budget concerns and reacted with a 
decentralization of responsibility about the health care budget. County 
councils are in charge of financing pharmaceuticals for out-patient and in-
patient care and check pharmacies´ budgets regularly. 
 
As a result of the decentralisation and increased awareness of costs also 
prescriptions of medicines are monitored in various county councils. The 
system works because physicians have to indicate a so-called code on the 
prescription before a patient can get a medicine reimbursed85. This code 
enables their superior to overlook all prescription patterns but physicians can 
also decide if they want to have access to statistics of their patterns. 
Prescription guidelines in Sweden are available on a national and a regional 
level. As long as it is not malpractice the guidelines should just guide but 
there are no explicit sanctions against physicians if they do not follow the 
guidance86. 
 
Regional committees in the county council point out first choice medicines 
and recommend certain treatment patterns and medicines. Some county 
councils have also installed incentive agreements to primary care centres 
and hospital clinics. These incentives usually try to give impetus to reach 
prescription and budget targets for effective prescribing and cost-aware 
treatment of patients87. 
 
Even though there is mandatory generic substitution in Sweden since 2002 
physicians are still encouraged to prescribe generics. 
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III.9.2.2 Patients 
Authorities try to inform patients about prices, reimbursement and 
recommended dosage, at contraindications, side effects etc. This is done 
through homepages by the MPA, the pharmacies and other institutions88. 
 
Co-payment regulations have an interesting approach advantaging patients 
with high health care costs. A patient has to pay full price of a reimbursable 
product, up to a certain cost level of € 97. As soon as this level is reached, 
co-payment reductions grow in four steps (status 2006)89: 
 
• 50% of the costs between € 97 and 183. 
• 75% of the costs between € 183 and 355. 
• 90% of the costs between € 355 and 463. 
• 0% of the costs above € 463. 
 
Like in most European countries you find a high VAT on pharmaceuticals. 
Sweden is different in this case. OTC products need to be taxed with 25% 
and POMs are exempt from VAT. 
 
III.9.2.3 Pharmacies 
All pharmacies in Sweden are state-owned and organised as one formal 
chain named Apoteket. This situation and that the state has a monopoly 
status of pharmacies in its country is unique in Europe. This also includes 
that prices in pharmacies are the same all over Sweden. 
 
The market share of internet pharmacies has increased in the last two years. 
Since 2006 pharmacies have been able to sell OTC products and POMs 
online. 
 
The retail margin of the pharmacies is decided by the Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Board (LFN). There are different margins for OTC products and prescription-
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only medicines. The margin consists of a flat rate per prescription and on a 
fee which depends on the price of the pack.  
 
The LFN changed the pharmacy mark-up scheme in 2006. The change 
meant an increase of the mark-up scheme. The last decrease of the mark-up 
scheme had occurred was in January 2005. 
 
Since October 2002 generic substitution is mandatory in Sweden according 
to the Act on Pharmaceutical Benefits. The regulation includes generics and 
parallel imported pharmaceuticals90. The LFN announced this law as a great 
success in 2005, when a result showed that the regulation had decreased 
generic prices by 40%91. 
 
The new government which started its period in office in fall 2006 has 
announced the goal to deregulate the pharmacy market and abolish the state 
monopoly to decrease prices, increase accessibility and secure supply of 
medicines92. It has imposed a Committee of Inquiry which presented its final 
report to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in January 2008. The report 
includes mechanisms which will enable others than governmental owned 
pharmacies to dispense both prescription and non-prescription 
pharmaceuticals. However, every actor who wants to retail pharmaceuticals 
needs to get a permit from the Medical Product Agency. First the government 
will found a new company that owns all the state pharmacies. This company 
will be in charge of selling a certain number to private individuals. This new 
appraisal was consented in a parliament election on May 8th 2008 and the 
new deregulation of the pharmaceutical market will be active on January 1st 
200993. 
 
III.10 Regulation in France 
France has one of the highest health care expenditure rates among the old 
EU countries94. The health care system stands for weak regulations. The 
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supply side regulations are mainly based on negotiations and price-volume 
agreements. The demand side is much less guided or provided with fewer 
incentives for cost-aware prescribing and dispensing than in most other EU 
states95. 
 
III.10.1 Supply Side 
The French pharmaceutical regulation starts off with the usual procedure of 
authorizing medicines according to a reasonable quality and security. 
Afterwards the Medicy Agency separates the products in POM and OTC 
pharmaceuticals. These are then directly monitored for pricing and 
reimbursement possibilities. 
 
 III.10.1.1 Price Control 
In the out-patient market the manufacturer can choose if he wants to apply 
for reimbursement or not. If producers decide to enter the non-
reimbursement market he can set the price freely. If he chooses to enter the 
reimbursement market, the Pricing Committee controls prices and regulates 
the status of reimbursement. 
 
In negotiations between the industry and the Economic Committee for Health 
Care Products (CEPS) the ex factory prices are set. If an agreement can not 
be reached, prices are set by the CEPS. Apart from wholesalers´ margins 
also pharmacists´ margins are regulated. These regulations have duration of 
four years. The latest agreement was signed in 2007. 
 
The pricing procedure in France relies on an internal and external price 
referencing. The internal price referencing carries out a comparison of prices 
for all reimbursable pharmaceutical. This comparison is usually based on the 
DDD of treatment. The external price referencing process takes about 14 
days. Applying companies need to set their price at least similar to the price 
accepted in Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK. 
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Generic´s prices are also regulated. and there is an incentive for 
manufacturers to apply for reimbursement with a low price. If a generics 
producer applies for a price that is a certain percentage below the branded 
price it will be accepted for the reimbursement list immediately. In 2006 the 
price of generics was supposed to be half the price of branded 
pharmaceuticals96. 
 
Like mentioned in the introduction not only prices but also wholesale and 
pharmacy margins and mark-ups, sales taxes and dispensing fees for 
products are regulated in France. Since 1990 a regressive mark-up scheme 
has been in place which was changed in 1999 with the introduction of a fixed 
fee per pack for pharmacists. In 2004 authorities changed it again. It was 
transformed to a three revel mark-up scheme which is still valid today. 
 
Any international price changes in the mentioned countries also need to be 
reflected by the company in France and companies need to sign a contract 
for sales forecasts. This price-volume agreement, which is also negotiated 
between the CEPS and the Association of Pharmaceutical Industry also 
include a payback clause if agreed sales are exceeded97. 
 
France was one of the first countries publishing prices for more then twenty 
years and making them access able for the public. Nowadays this information 
can be seen on the internet through the homepages 98  of the sickness 
funds99. 
 
 III.10.1.2 Reimbursement 
The reimbursement scheme is product and disease specific. A positive list 
holds all the reimbursed pharmaceuticals. For including a product in the 
positive list economical studies are not legally required. A composition of the 
Transparency Commission which is in charge of reimbursement decisions is 
defined through twenty members from authorities and the industry with voting 
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rights. This Commission decides on the rate of reimbursement according to 
two appraisals.  
 
The first appraisal determines the actual level of clinical benefit on the basis 
of medical value, interest for public health and which population group is 
targeted through the product. The usual reimbursement rate is 65%. If there 
is no special gravity the rate is only 35%.  
 
The second appraisal is set by the level of improvement of clinical benefit. 
This appraisal is structured in five stages varying from new therapeutic area 
to no improvement drugs. For this precise determination comparisons are 
made with the products of the same Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical 
classification code and also with products with the same therapeutic 
indications. The reimbursement rate for severe diseases can be 100% which 
is listed in a special list approved by Minister of Health. In the de-listing 
process the actual reimbursement rate comes only to 15% which is just a 
temporary rate for vein tonics100.  
 
 III.10.1.3 Reference Price system 
In France there is no particular reference price system. But a part of the 
generic sector has been regulated through a reference price system since 
August 2003. For example often one level of reimbursement is set for a 
whole generic product group. The reimbursement rate and the generic price 
are both based on this tariff. The list includes 153 generic groups101. 
 
If companies want to be granted with reimbursement without a process delay 
it needs to offer a manufacturer price that is half the price of the branded 
pharmaceutical (2006)102. 
 
III.10.1.4 Expenditure Regulations 
There are several expenditure regulations in place in France. As mentioned 
in the pricing section profit-volume regulations are in place. When companies 
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exceed the expected sales paybacks need to be spend by the companies. 
This system which has been implemented in 2002 has been working 
according to the groups of therapeutically related pharmaceuticals103. Usually 
high value medicines and low-cost drugs are excluded from the plan for 
several years. If the manufacturers’ turnover increases faster than a 
predetermined rate, companies must pay back a part of it to sickness funds. 
These parts vary between 55% and 68.1% for an excess of 1% to 8%. In 
2004 the threshold of one percent was fixed for 2005 till 2007104. 
 
III.10.2 Demand Side 
The demand side faces few regulations and financial incentives. However 
patients are encouraged to cost-aware behaviour through cost-sharing rules 
and information gained from sickness funds. 
 
III.10.2.1 Physicians 
In France there are no pharmaceutical budgets in place to give monetary 
incentives to prescribe cheap pharmaceuticals. Still the prescription habits or 
the volume is monitored by sickness funds. This way physicians can be 
advised and encouraged to prescribe cheap and effective products. Since 
2007 physicians are able to follow their “prescription profile”105 online on the 
sickness funds´ web sites106. As there are no financial incentives for cost-
aware prescription recommendations and assistance can only be given 
through information and non-binding guidance. France has increased the 
availability of computerized software by the High Authority for Health to foster 
particular methods of prescription according to the INN and substitution for 
products with the same substance. Since 2004 the High Authority of Health is 
in charge of publishing guidelines for the fully reimbursed pharmaceuticals. 
 
Physicians are not only verbally encouraged to prescribe generics. But there 
are certain indirect monetary incentives for them as well. It was for example 
targeted that physicians need to prescribe at least 15% generics per year107. 
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However, if pharmaceutical expenditure grows too quickly it might be the 
case that consultation and visit fees will not increase. Target budgets were 
also introduced for setting a lower limit requirement for physicians to 
prescribe at least fifteen percent generics per annum108. 
 
Dispensing remuneration of physicians is similar to the remuneration of 
pharmacies109. 
 
III.10.2.2 Patients 
In France co-payment does exist in a fixed and a percentage scheme. The 
fixed co-payment includes € 0.53 for each pack of pharmaceuticals, that the 
patient purchases. The patient also pays a fixed co-payment for consultations 
with a physician. Here the maximum out-of-pocket payment (OPP) is € 50 
per year. Percentage co-payment is set by the difference between the rate of 
reimbursement and 100%. So it can either be 0%, 35%, 65%, 85% or 100% 
corresponding to the actual reimbursement rate of the purchased product110. 
 
Usually patients are informed about rational use of pharmaceuticals through 
the sickness funds. These advertise and do fund campaigns to inform and 
educate patients throughout France. 
 
III.10.2.3 Pharmacies 
Pharmacists´ remuneration depends on the profit margin plus the flat fee per 
package. If the ex-factory price is below € 22.90 the margin is 26.1% of the 
price. This margin decreases for products from € 22.91 to € 150 to 10% and 
finally finds its lowest point at 6% for products with ex-factory prices above 
150. Additionally € 0.53 fee per package needs to be added111. 
 
In June 1999 France has introduced optional generic substitution. Parallel 
imports are included in the substitution system. Pharmacies are also allowed 
to substitute generic prescriptions with branded pharmaceuticals. There are 
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also indirect financial incentives to substitute branded pharmaceuticals. It 
was for example targeted that physicians need to prescribe at least 15% 
generics per year112. If this recommended rate of substitution is not reached 
new reference rates will be implemented and pharmacists would that way 
loose money113. Generics have started to be promoted after the GP network 
was established in 2002114. 
 
Comparing the VAT in France with other countries (Germany 19%) it is quite 
low and differs from reimbursed pharmaceuticals to non-reimbursable 
medicines. It is only 2.1% for reimbursable pharmaceuticals and 5.1% for 
non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals. 
 
III.11 Denmark 
Denmark has an analytically interesting system because of the many 
changes it has gone through in the last decade. The indirect price control 
through reimbursement was a external price reference system from 2000 to 
2005 and was changed to a consumption based system, quite similar to 
Sweden’s approach of calculating the reimbursement rate, in 2005. However 
the demand side is weakly regulated115. 
 
III.11.1 Supply Side 
Manufacturer and wholesale prices or corresponding profits are not regulated 
in Denmark. Pharmaceuticals are therefore in general freely priced. But 
through reimbursement regulations and pharmacy profit control prices are 
indirectly regulated. Between 2000 and 2005 external price referencing was 
in use to calculate the reimbursement prices. Here European average prices 
were set equal to the reference prices in the reimbursement scheme.  
 
III.11.1.1 Pricing 
Wholesale margins are not regulated by law but are usually negotiated 
between the wholesalers and the pharmacies. These margins are not 
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officially known. An indirect profit control is set through the mark-up scheme 
of pharmacy’s profits116 to calculate the pharmacy retail price. Until March 
2007 the related negotiations were scheduled every two years and 
correspondingly the mark-up scheme was adjusted. In April 2007 a linear 
mark-up scheme was implemented.  
 
Denmark has a long history of price agreements with the pharmaceutical 
industry. Some agreements were on price cuts, freezes and some 
agreements were also statutory. The latest price ceiling was based on a 
voluntary agreement in December 2006 and started being valid for two years 
in January 2007. The aim is to eliminate uncertainties on reimbursement 
policies. However, authorities agreed not to make major changes in the 
reimbursement system without involving the Danish Association of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry117. 
 
III.11.1.2 Reimbursement 
In Denmark the decision-making power to decide on reimbursement issues is 
in the hands of the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA). Even prices can be 
freely chosen by the manufacturer and are not regulated by authorities they 
are still important for reimbursement issues and the price of a product needs 
to be in a reasonable relation to the therapeutic value118. When a company 
applies for reimbursement it needs to state the pharmacy retail price for cost-
effectiveness analysis because this price is relevant for looking at the relation 
to the therapeutic value. Another factor relevant is if the pharmaceutical has 
a safe and valuable therapeutic effect on a specifically defined indication119. 
 
Generics are regulated and reimbursement issues are handled the same way 
as for branded pharmaceuticals. It is even not necessary to get 
recommendation from the Reimbursement Committee. Still prices should not 
be higher than the once from the original product. 
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Until 2000 all pharmaceuticals eligible for reimbursement could either be 
reimbursed for 50% or 74%. Nowadays the reimbursement system has a 
similar set up to Sweden’s system. The reimbursement rate changes with the 
consumption of the patient. It was introduced in April 2000. According to the 
status of January 2007 the reimbursement rate for adults is set according to 
the following scheme120: 
 
Expenses per annum Reimbursement rate 
below € 62 0% 
€ 62 - € 151 50% 
€ 151 - € 355 75% 
over € 355 85% 
 
100% reimbursement is only for chronically ill and terminally ill patients. 
 
The reference price system in Denmark goes back to 1993. But the current 
system is managed by the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA) and entered 
into force in 2005 in the Danish Health Act, No. 546 of 24th of June 2005121. 
The main characteristic of the system is that similar pharmaceuticals are 
equally clustered in reimbursement groups which are the same ones as the 
groups for generic substitution122. Denmark groups the drugs based on active 
ingredient, forms of assigns and forms of strength. 
 
These groups´ reference prices are updated whenever new pharmaceuticals 
or new package sizes etc. are launched or withdraw from the pharmaceutical 
market123 . The reference price is the lowest price within the substitution 
group. If a product is reimbursed due to a price equal or below the reference 
price the reimbursement rate depends on consumption and can vary as 
mentioned before124. 
 
This implies that when a physician prescribes a product more expensive than 
its reference price from the lowest substitution group and forbids generic 
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substitution that the patient has to pay regular co-payment and the difference 
between the two products125.  
 
III.11.2 Demand Side 
Danish demand side regulations focus more on the patient and are fairly 
weak for the stakeholders such as physicians and pharmacies. Physicians 
face a relative freedom and pharmacies do not need to follow regulations 
except generic substitution. Patients are encouraged and informed through 
campaigns and cost-sharing forces them to cost-aware behaviour. 
 
III.11.2.1 Physicians 
Budgetary constraints for physicians are not in place in Denmark. But still 
cost-ware treatment may be necessary. Physicians have to consider the 
reimbursement policy when prescribing pharmaceuticals due to the 
consumption based reimbursement rate. 
 
General Practioners receive an evaluation of their prescribing habits on a 
regular basis which includes the amount and costs of all the prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. This was implemented to rise increase the physician’s cost-
awareness and comparability with other physicians in the region. In the last 
years a computerized monitoring named ORDIPRAX126  was implemented 
which is an online system. Here physicians can compare their own 
prescribing habits with the habits of other physicians in the same region127. 
 
Prescription guidelines are mostly not binding in Denmark and rely on 
recommendations, advices and reimbursement rules128. This is in one way 
achieved through the mentioned monitoring but also through an annual 
voluntary audit for physicians, information journals on pharmaceutical 
recommendations in different therapeutic areas and finally through the 
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Danish College of General Practioners´ guideline 129  accessibility for 
pharmacists and physicians online130. 
 
Generic prescribing is not allowed in Denmark but physicians have to use the 
name of the pharmaceutical (for original, a generic and a parallel imported 
product) when prescribing131.  
 
III.11.2.2 Patients 
Danish patients can gain information on prices and pharmaceuticals through 
the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA). The DKMS offers an extensive 
internet platform which informs about “prices of pharmaceuticals, the patient 
percentage co-payment and the possibility of generic substitution, their 
content including benefits and any potential risks”132. 
 
Out-of-pocket payments that patients need to raise can be fixed and 
percentage co-payments. Before calculating the reimbursement level a flat 
dispensing fee of € 1.34 for each medicine package needs to be added to the 
reimbursement price. Percentage co-payment is the answer to the 
consumption based reimbursement rates. The higher the reimbursement 
rate, the lower is the percentage co-payment by the patient. Hence is the 
reimbursement rate is 75% for example the co-payment rate is 25% so the 
whole price of the product is raised. The period from where pharmaceutical 
expenses are calculated is the first of March. From there every twelve 
months a new reimbursement period starts.  
 
III.11.2.3 Pharmacies 
Pharmacies have a monopoly on sales of POMs to patients. Pharmacies 
must be run by a pharmacists and need to have a permission from the 
Government to dispense pharmaceuticals in a certain location. However, due 
to increasing opportunities through the internet a rising proportion of 
pharmacies have started selling products online. As mentioned in the chapter 
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on pricing pharmacists’ margins are strictly regulated and the mark-up 
scheme as been switched from regressive to linear in April 2007. The current 
regulation notices that the PPP times 0.088 and a constant amount is the 
mark-up scheme133. 
 
Since 1991 voluntary substitution has been allowed. This was changed into 
an obligatory generic substitution law in 1997134. This forces physicians to 
always dispense the cheapest substitute available.  Still patients and 
physicians can refuse the substitution but have to deal with higher co-
payment. As seen in the section of reference pricing there is a close 
connection between generic substitution and reference pricing. The 
reimbursement groups are the same groups as the substitution groups and 
non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals are included in the substitution scheme. 
 
Claw-backs are not used in Denmark and there are no financial incentives for 
cost-efficient decision making. 
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IV. Analysis of the impact of regulation on off-patent drug prices:  
Data and Methods 
The preceding section has highlighted the complexity of shown regulation in 
European pharmaceutical markets. In order to analyze if specific regulations 
have a negative and significantly effect on prices the IMS MIDAS dataset has 
been used for that purpose. Price and sales data were obtained from 
Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) for fourteen available ACE 1 
inhibitors (Captopril, Cilazapril, Enalipril, Lisinopril, Ramipril, Moexpril, 
Fosinopril, Quinapril, Trandolapril, Benazepril, Perindopril, Imidapril, 
Zofenopril, Spirapril), in six EU member states (Germany, UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Denmark) on a quarterly basis over the 
period 1991-2006. 
 
Table 9: Overview on IMS Data for the empirical model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All monetary figures which include sales and prices are in Euros. Additionally, 
inflation and currency adjustment were employed based on the exchange 
and inflation rates given by the World Development Index (WDI)135. To adjust 
different formulations, prices and sales of pharmaceuticals a weighted price 
index per molecule for originator and for generics was constructed to obtain a 
comparable basis. 
 
IV.1 Rationale for country and the therapeutic class selection 
For the empirical analysis six countries (UK, Germany, France, Denmark, 
Netherlands and Sweden) have been selected marked with the indicator i in 
the model. To gain insight to the effects of regulations on generics´ prices 
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from an empirical analysis it is essential to select and analyse countries in 
this empirical analysis which reflect the variety of pharmaceutical supply and 
demand side regulation schemes prevailing in EU member states. Otherwise 
it can not be distinguished between methods and influence of these 
regulations on prices and market shares of pharmaceutical products. The 
challenge of this analysis is that all countries use direct and indirect systems 
to regulate prices. Hence it is important to include a diversity of countries in 
the empirical investigation which on one hand have quite a free pricing 
system and on the other hand a direct price control, different indirect policy 
control tools like profit control, economic analysis or reference pricing.  Even 
though the intention seems clear it is not easy to choose because of several 
reforms that have taken place in the last decades within each country you 
might consider. Generally speaking because of international reference and 
European inter-correspondence the reforms that have taken place in Europe 
have narrowed down the regulation differences between the countries. 
 
The selection of the countries is based on two primary criteria. I have 
selected large, often referenced and important markets like Germany, France 
and the UK and countries which are very specific in their use of methodology 
and tradition to regulate their pharmaceutical market (Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark). All countries have a significant variety of regulatory approaches. 
 
According to these criteria six countries have been selected to be explicitly 
introduced and empirically analysed in this thesis. 
 
Germany, with the third largest pharmaceutical market in the world and also 
mostly price referenced market in Europe, gives a unique combination of free 
pricing and few regulations on the demand and supply side. However, it is 
the first country in Europe which introduced reference pricing for patent 
expired medicines in first instance. 
 
The United Kingdom is also one of the biggest and most important drug 
markets in the world. Furthermore, it is known for its unique indirect price 
control via rate of return regulation (profit control) and for explicitly tackling 
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the demand-side through a mix of regulatory measures such as clawbacks 
and incentives (e.g. prescribing guidance, monitoring audit, budget etc.). 
 
France has the highest health care expenditure relative to the GDP in Europe 
and is the third largest drug producer in the world accounting for 7% of the 
world’s drug output. Additionally, France has also one of the highest per 
capita spending. Market size, the country’s importance in Europe and a 
system in which regulations are principally based on negotiations and 
agreements both on the supply- and the demand-side elevate France to a 
unique position among European markets.  
 
The Netherlands have a different concept of regulating their pharmaceutical 
market. It strongly regulates several market stakeholders and had already 
implemented an international reference price system over ten years ago. This 
is combined with the case of reference pricing and the use of economic 
analysis for new medicines. Together with the UK, the Netherlands has a 
unique approach to providing incentives to physicians and pharmacists, 
including the claw back for the letter136. 
 
The Scandinavian countries have shown parallel to their economic success 
in the last decades also several influential and effective reforms in the 
pharmaceutical market based on their social traditions, tax funded health 
care system and the intention to decrease the rate of growth in 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Therefore a specific analysis of Sweden and 
Denmark was considered to be useful. 
 
Sweden has a tradition of social support of medicines. However, Sweden 
was able to keep the drug expenditure relatively low (drug expenditure was 
13.3% of the health care expenditure in 2006). This might be due to its 
system which shows a huge variety of cost-effectiveness analysis for price 
regulations. Another reason for a specific look at Sweden are the reforms 
that have taken place since 2002. The reimbursement and pricing decisions 
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have been combined and the reimbursement rate has been adapted to the 
consumption. 
 
Finally, Denmark, has introduced several reforms over the past decade. It 
has its approach to free pricing and weak regulations on the demand side, 
put relies on very aggressive purchasing of medicines which introduce an 
element of competition to the Danish pharmaceutical market. 
 
Including these six selected countries the empirical analysis should offer 
insights to some major countries, shows a huge variety of regulations on the 
supply and demand side and European states with either a history of high or 
low health care expenditure. 
 
ACE (Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme) inhibitors are a group of 
pharmaceuticals that are used to treat the chronic illnesses hypertension and 
congestive heart failure. The market volume is quite high and has been 
growing in the last decades. This growth has also increased the drug 
expenditure. ACE inhibitors are will diffused and the market shows a healthy 
balance between on-patent and off-patent producers. The empirical results 
obtained, however, are by no means representative of the entire 
pharmaceutical market. 
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IV.2 The empirical Model 
The IMS data is used to explore the developments of prices after patent 
expiry and the influence of regulations and market competition on the prices 
of generics and originators. Therefore the models include generic and 
branded prices described by several variables. The empirical models which 
are used to analyse the panel data are simple due to the fact that they are 
one of the first analysis of its kind. The algebraic forms of the used models 
testing at drug level are as follows: 
 
(1)  Pijb = α + β1*GPresent + β2*Nijg + β3*D1i + β4*D2i + ... β10*D8i + 
β11*Ttrend + εij 
 
(2) Ρijg = α + β1*Nijg+ β2*D1i + β3*D2i + ... β9*Di + β10*Ttrend + εij 
 
 (3) Ρijg = α + β1*Nijg+ β2*Pijb + β3*D1i + β4*D2i + ... β10*Di + β11*Ttrend + 
εij 
 
The dependent variable for the analysis is in model 1 by the weighted 
average branded price (Pijb) and in model 2 formed by the weighted average 
generic price index for country i and product j (Pijg). These prices are 
expected to be described by prices, generic presence, the number of generic 
producers, several dummy variables or a time trend. The date of generic 
entry and start and implementation has been identified as the first quarter 
where a second producer has larger sales than 0. Therefore some co-
licensing manufacturers might be considered as generic producers. 
 
D1i to D8i (named as RF, SM, CONTGEN, MARKUPREG, PROFITC, 
TAXFUNDED, CEA, CLAWBACK) are selected dummy variables 
representing demand side and supply side regulations employed or not 
employed in the selected country i. Because the introduction and existence of 
certain regulations differs by country, the actual implementation date has 
been identified and introduced to the analysis. Because there is some 
general price inflation in the pharmaceutical market a time trend on a quarter 
basis is employed in the model to capture this factor (Ttrend named as 
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QUARTER). The number of generic competitors (N named as N) and a 
variable to show if a generic competitor is present or not (GPresent named as 
GENERICS) are also included in the model. εij is the error term. Expected 
results for the variables are explained in the next section (IV. The Variables). 
 
The analysed panel data combines cross section (country, weighted average 
price index and net ingredient) and time series data (1991-2006). It needs to 
be considered that heteroscedasticity, as the variance of the error terms 
might not be constant. Hence prices are logged to decrease this problem and 
a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is taken to identify if 
heteroscedasticity needs to be harmed by standard robust errors137.  
 
IV.3 The Variables 
Regulation is usually introduced in the pharmaceutical market to ensure 
“Efficiency, Equity and Quality” 138  and accordingly decrease prices of 
pharmaceuticals. Hence, the “null hypothesis” about any dummy variable in 
the empirical analysis should be that regulations have a negative effect on 
generic and branded prices. In any case, it might occur that certain 
regulations do not show a significant value, are inefficient or just decreased 
prices once (e.g., price freeze) rather than over a certain time period. 
 
Table 10: H0 Hypothesis for all describing variables of all models 
                               
 
                                                 
137
 Test in Appendix 
138
 Mrazek and Frank 2004 
Dependent Variables 
 
Pijb Pijg 
Pijb -------- (+) 
Pijg (+) -------- 
GPresent (-) -------- 
Nijg (-) (-) 
All Dij (-) (-) 
Ttrend -------- -------- 
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On the supply side were chosen four dummy variables, namely, reference 
pricing, price control of generics, profit control and cost effectiveness 
analysis. These have been chosen because they either are the most basic 
regulations existing in the health care market (reference pricing), are 
standing for a unique system (e.g., profit control in the UK) or present newest 
approaches to pharmaeconomic evaluations within the health care sector. 
 
Reference Pricing (RP) presents an indicator variable which provides 
information about the existence of a reference price system for 
reimbursement matters within the discussed countries. The variable defines 
the reference price system existence even if the regulation does only apply 
for certain groups of pharmaceuticals. Empirical evidence from the literature 
has suggested that reference pricing has a minor negative effect on the 
prices in a pharmaceutical market, especially if it is connected to appropriate 
demand side regulations (Kanavos, Font-Costa and Seeley 2008). This does 
make sense because it encourages manufacturers to decrease their prices to 
achieve reimbursement. 
 
Price control of generics (CONTGEN) is a variable that distinguishes 
between countries that have price control regulations that are just valid for 
branded pharmaceuticals, countries with no price regulation and countries 
with specific price regulations for generics. Only for pricing regulations that 
hold either for all pharmaceuticals or regulations that only hold for generics 
(e.g., UK where a special maximum price scheme was implemented in 
August 2000) the dummy variable takes a 1. Different degrees of price 
control between countries are not considered by the variable. However, it is 
expected that the dummy variable present a significantly negative effect on 
the prices of generics due to a price limitation for manufacturers. 
 
The industrial regulation dummy variable named profit control (PROFITC) 
was defined as an indicator if a country has any indirect price control through 
profit control regulations. The variable only holds for regulations applying for 
manufacturer’s profits. For voluntary schemes such as in the UK where a 
price control is used as a threat to stabilize a voluntary profit control 
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agreement the indicator variable also takes a 1. Because governments try to 
limit profits and indirectly encourage companies to react with price 
reductions, this indicator is supposed to provide negative influence on 
generic prices. 
 
The last supply side dummy variable used in the regression analysis is the 
factor if countries have implemented a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) 
for reimbursement decisions. This cost-effectiveness analysis could be 
compulsory or mandatory and needs to affect the reimbursement decision, its 
rate or the reference pricing scheme. Nevertheless, it should strengthen the 
entry criteria for reimbursement. Additionally reimbursement schemes are 
encouraged to increase analytical attention to pharmaceutical prices. 
Therefore the cost-effectiveness analysis shall decrease prices in the market. 
 
There are three demand-side dummy variables that have been installed, 
namely, substitution mandatory, mark-up scheme on pharmacies regressive 
and clawbacks. These three variables were chosen to specifically analyse 
pharmacists´ behaviour and their influence on generic prices within the drug 
market to see whether regulations provide good incentives and if coexistence 
of supply side and demand side regulations lead to desired effects. Generally 
speaking the demand side regulations intend (such as supply side 
regulations) to increase generics´ market share, increase patients´ 
consumption of pharmaceuticals and finally to decrease prices on the 
pharmaceutical market. 
 
The dummy variable substitution mandatory (SM) takes a 1 if a pharmacy 
is obliged to dispense a generic when a branded pharmaceutical was 
prescribed and the physician has not explicitly requested the pharmacy not to 
substitute. The substitution variable is expected to have ambiguous effects. 
Certainly they have been installed to decrease pharmaceutical prices. This 
result is also expected. However, it might be the case that generic 
substitution for example increases market shares of generics because of 
derived substitution effects and on the other hand decrease the prices of 
originators to adjust to substitution. With a growing market share of generics, 
 77 
the demand for generics could grow. Accordingly prices of generics could 
also increase. 
 
Another variable concerning pharmaceutical behaviour within the drugs 
market is the variable mark-up scheme on pharmacies regressive 
(MARKUPREG). This dummy shows if pharmacies have to follow a 
regressive mark-up scheme or not. It does not show if there is any mark-up 
scheme implemented in the country and also not to what level the regulation 
controls pharmacies´ sales and prices. The variable takes a 1 even for 
regulation schemes that are not precisely regressive but show a similar 
behaviour (e.g., Germany where the scale has instead a declining flat fee 
structure). A regressive mark-up scheme for pharmacies serves as a 
financial incentive to distribute cheaper pharmaceuticals. Therefore it is 
expected that pharmaceutical producers will decrease their prices to be 
chosen by pharmacies. However, it could also be differently due to the same 
argument given about substitution. A regressive mark-up scheme could 
increase the market share of generics, their demand and correspondingly 
their prices. 
 
The last demand side dummy variable concerns clawback (CLAWBACK) 
regulations within the systems. This variable does not consider payback 
schemes for price-volume control systems or other possible supply side 
clawback regulations. It just applies for clawback regulations concerning the 
demand side. The variable takes a 1 if clawbacks in the shape of discounts of 
pharmacies´ dispensing fees claimed by insurances or clawbacks in the 
shape of discounts on pharmacy purchase costs of drugs are implemented in 
the country’s health care sector. Otherwise it takes a 0. Clawback regulations 
tend to decrease prices in generic markets. 
 
The last indicator variable shows if the health care system (TAXFUNDED) 
is financed through public contribution or if it is funded by taxes. In systems 
where both funding is possible the indicator chooses the system which has a 
higher share. Especially in the case of the Netherlands where 65% of the 
citizens are under compulsory health insurance paid by the people and their 
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employers it could be argued that a contribution and tax based financing is 
being used. In this case it has been decided to choose that the dummy 
variable considers Netherlands to be a contribution based health care 
system. Generally the indicator variable presenting the form of funding for the 
health care system is expected to show that a tax funded health care system 
includes higher prices than a system which is financed through contribution. 
 
Empirical results have suggested earlier that regulation has a limited effect 
on prices and that competition among producers and products is more 
sufficient to decrease prices in the market. To analyse this question two 
variables were included to analyse competition factors. If a generic is present 
or not is shown by the variable (GENERICS). Intuitively, this variable is 
supposed to show a decrease of branded prices. The same results are 
expected for the variable which indicated the number of generic competitors 
(N). This should increase competition and correspondingly decrease prices.  
 
Finally to every regression a time trend was added (QUARTER). A dummy 
variable for each quarter except the first quarter (60 quarters) was included to 
get rid of time effects. 
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V. Empirical Results 
In pursuing the analysis, several regressions were estimated which included 
generic prices, branded prices, regulation variables (underneath the line in 
every table) and competition measures such as a variable that indicates 
whether generic producers are present (GENERICS) or a variable which 
presents the number of generics (N). The first table shows the estimation 
from model (1). 
 
Table 11: Estimation results of model 1 
           
 
 
As table 11 shows, the estimation coefficient of the number of generics (N), 
the presence of generic competitors (GENERICS), regulations to control 
prices (CONTGEN) and clawbacks (CLAWBACK) are statistically significant 
at a 5% significance level. All significant variables have a negative influence 
on the prices. This means that the results are in line with the hypotheses 
expected. For all other variables the estimators are not significant. 
 
An increase in N by one competitor can be interpreted as a decrease of 3.3% 
in branded prices. The indicator which presents the presence of generic 
competitors has an even more influential impact. Drugs which face generic 
competition have 33.2% lower prices than products without generic 
competition. Price control measures of generics, which could obviously also 
Ordinary Least Square 
Dependent Variable: Branded Prices (ln) 
3402 Observations, R-squared = 0.2249, F (70, 3331) = 13.82* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
GENERICS 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-0.033  0.002  -15.76  0* 
-0.332  0.391  -8.47  0* 
0.068  0.663  1.03  0.303 
-0.176  0.688  -2.56  0.011 
-0.344  0.565  -6.09  0* 
0.005  0.084  0.06  0.952 
-0.024  0.132  -0.19  0.852 
-0.166  0.621  -2.68             0.01* 
-0.12  0.677  -1.76  0.078 
0.067  0.078  0.86  0.388 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
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influence branded prices decrease the prices of branded pharmaceuticals by 
34.4%. 
 
In summary, it can be said that regulation seems to fail to decrease branded 
prices except through direct control schemes such as clawbacks or 
regulation of prices. 
 
The second empirical analysis, which was conducted to see how regulations 
influence prices presents results for regulatory and competition variables on 
generic prices in the drug market. The following table shows the results from 
model 2. 
 
Table 12: Estimation results of model 2 
          
 
 
As table 12 shows, the estimation coefficient of the number of generics (N), 
reference pricing (RF) and regulations to control prices (CONTGEN) are 
statistically significant at a 5% significance level. All significant variables have 
a negative influence on the prices except reference pricing. Hence, reference 
pricing does not go in line with the H0-hypothesis. For all other variables the 
estimators are not significant. 
 
An increase in N by one competitor decreases generic prices by 5%. For 
regulations the results give ambiguous and unexpected indications. On the 
Ordinary Least Square (standard robust error) 
Dependent Variable: Generic Prices (ln) 
1701 Observations, R-squared = 0.3105, F (70, 1576) = 15.46* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-0.05  0.002  -26.12  0* 
 
0.481  0.12  4.09  0* 
-0.14  0.105  -1.33  0.182 
-0.306  0.096  -3.19  0.00* 
0.119  0.134  -0.86  0.39 
-0.396  0.238  -1.66  0.096 
-0.101  0.105  -0.96  0.338 
-0.071  0.119  0.6  0.552 
-0.189  0.144  -1.31  0.19 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
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one hand, countries with reference pricing have 48% higher generic prices, 
while on the other hand, countries with price control have 30.6% lower prices 
than ones without price control. 
´ 
In summary, it appears that regulation has limited effects on generic prices. 
 
The third empirical analysis, which was conducted to see how regulations 
influence prices presents results for regulatory and competition variables on 
generic prices in the drug market including branded prices as a describing 
variable. The following graph shows the results from model 3. 
 
Table 13: Estimation results of model 3 
         
 
 
As table 13 shows the estimation coefficient of the number of generics (N), 
branded prices (BRANEDD PRICES), reference pricing (RF), mandatory 
substitution (SM), regulations to control prices (CONTGEN), clawbacks 
(CLAWBACKS) and tax funded systems (TAXFUNDED) are statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level. Except the number of generic 
producers all significant variables have a positive influence on the prices. For 
all other variables the estimators are not significant. 
 
As in model 3 one could argue that there is the problem of endogeneity 
because generic prices might depend on branded prices and vice versa, 
Ordinary Least Square (standard robust error) 
Dependent Variable: Generic Prices (ln) 
1647 Observations, R-squared = 0.8503, F (70, 1576) = 267.26* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
BRANDED PRICES (ln) 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-0.012  0.001  -10.24  0* 
1.058  0.017  63.46  0* 
0.154  0.045  3.38  0.001* 
0.196  0.447  4.39  0* 
0.188  0.038  4.98  0* 
0.104  0.059  1.76  0.079 
-0.13  0.104  -1.24  0.214 
0.179  0.045  3.93  0* 
-0.267  0.045  -5.9  0* 
-0.03  0.065  -0.46  0.642 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
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results might not be useful. A look at specific countries, regulation seems to 
have a limited effect. Usually the number of generics and the presence of 
generic producers decrease prices of pharmaceuticals, although most 
regulations show no significant influence on the prices. However, if regulation 
shows significant coefficients, the results dismiss our hypothesis and are 
positive. The following gives three examples of empirical results for three 
unique countries (Denmark, Germany and the UK) should present this 
finding. 
 
To understand the results one must consider that any regulation which was 
present in a country for the whole analysed time period drops out of the 
empirical statistics. Therefore no results can be conducted for these 
regulations. 
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Table 14: Estimation results of model 1 on Denmark, Germany and the UK 
  
  
 
United Kingdom: Ordinary Least Square 
Dependent Variable: Branded Prices (ln) 
588 Observations, R-squared = 0.2208, F (62, 525) = 2.40* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
GENERICS 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-0.221  0.038  -5.79  0* 
0.364  0.219  1.66  0.097 
Dropped 
Dropped 
-0.118  0.379  -0.31  0.755 
Dropped 
Dropped 
-0.168  0.437  -0.39  0.700 
Dropped 
-0.16  0.388  -0.41  0.681 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
Germany: Ordinary Least Square 
Dependent Variable: Branded Prices (ln) 
685 Observations, R-squared = 0.4617, F (62, 662) = 8.60* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
GENERICS 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P> T 
-.0279  0.002  -13.63  0* 
-0.151  0.0683  -2.21  0.028 
Dropped 
-0.3985  0.2754  -1.45  0.148 
Dropped 
-0.6963  0.3397  -2.05  0.041 
Dropped 
-0.175  0.27  -0.65  0.517 
Dropped 
Dropped 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
Denmark: Ordinary Least Square 
Dependent Variable: Branded Prices (ln) 
504 Observations, R-squared = 0.254, F (62, 441) = 2.42* 
Ind. Variables 
N 
GENERICS 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-.109  0.012  -8.91  0* 
0.917  0.137  6.68  0* 
0.014  0.486  0.03  0.977 
-0.898  0.474  -1.89  0.059 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
0.602  0.444  1.36  0.175 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
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Regulations in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom seem not to 
show any significant effect on branded prices in the ACE-1 market. The only 
influence comes from generic competition, as can be seen in the significance 
of generic presence (N) and the number of generic producers (GENERICS). 
 
On a country basis, the results are partially different for generic prices 
compared to the empirical results on branded pharmaceuticals. Several 
regulations in selected countries show statistical significance and useful 
policy implications. 
 
Table 15: Estimation results of model 2 for Denmark 
            
 
 
E.g., regulation measures in Denmark, such as reference pricing and 
mandatory substitution, do have a significant and negative impact on prices. 
It seems that generic prices respond differently to regulation than branded 
producers do as expected in the hypothesis. The implemented mandatory 
substitution, in particular, shows a strong significant impact. Denmark’s 
generic prices decreased 185.7% when it introduced mandatory substitution 
which is a surprisingly successful implication. 
 
Considering that most regulation implication seems not to be suitable to 
decreasing drug prices and that empirical results show that most prices 
Denmark: Ordinary Least Square (robust standard error) 
Dependent Variable: Generic Prices (ln) 
 Observations, R-squared = 0.79 
Ind. Variables 
N 
 
RF 
SM 
CONTGEN 
MARKUPREG 
PROFITC 
CLAWBACK 
TAXFUNDED 
CEA 
Coefficient SE  T-Value P>T 
-0.1799  0.0146  -12.31  0* 
   
-0.2447  0.074  -3.33  0.00* 
-1.857  0.617  -3.01  0.00* 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
Dropped 
0.14  1  0.14  0.888 
* refers to a significance at 5%  
 85 
appear to fall due to competition through generic entry and generic 
competition, further research might be useful.  
 
 
 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The intention of the empirical analysis was to arrive at potential policy 
implications and research whether individual regulations perform better than 
others. However, results seem to be ambiguous. 
 
European countries have faced exploding health care costs in the last 
decades. Policy makers and governments search for ways to stop this 
ongoing trend. One relevant part of these costs is made by pharmaceutical 
expenditure. The pharmaceutical expenditure share of health care 
expenditure has been growing due to rising drug costs and growing drug 
consumption. Therefore the need for efficient regulations and incentives for 
market competition and decreasing pharmaceutical prices is significant. 
 
In sight of this problem this thesis tried to provide an introduction to the 
problem in most EU countries, show the regulation schemes in six countries 
and finally analyse statistically whether regulation leads to lower prices in the 
drug market, particularly in products whose patents have expired. 
 
Pricing and reimbursement schemes in most European countries are very 
different and the approaches to decrease drug costs are quite diverse. 
However, the last decade has shown how the variety of the approach to 
regulation between Europe countries has narrowed down. Nevertheless all 
EU countries are in search of regulation that delivers a positive effect on their 
budget. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that most regulation schemes do not lead to 
significant price reduction(s). Indeed price competition and, especially, 
generic pricing does seem to have significant influence on prices. 
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In summary, the analysis has shown that policy makers need to increase 
competition within their pharmaceutical markets, give incentives for generic 
market entry and only introduce certain market regulations, to stop the 
ongoing trend of rising drug costs. 
 
They appear to imply different regulations for patented and off-patent 
products as generic prices and branded prices react differently to regulation 
schemes. In general the empirical results suggest that regulation has limited 
power to control pharmaceutical prices for generics and branded 
pharmaceuticals. Nearly all regressions show that competition and generic 
entry enables market competition and corresponding price adjustments. 
Nevertheless, some regulations show negative and significant effects on 
prices and can be seen as possible implications to improve allocation and the 
drug expenses in European countries.  
 
Direct price controls have an impact on price reduction. This comes as no 
surprise, as direct interference in the market and obligatory control of pricing 
behaviour must have an effect. Other regulations such as reference pricing, 
mandatory substitution, profit controls or regressive mark up schemes for 
pharmacies seem not to be efficient. Secondly the data recommends 
improving generic entry possibilities and competition. Therefore, the data 
suggests, on the one hand, direct regulation of prices and, on the other hand, 
policy implications that improve opportunities for generics to enter 
pharmaceutical markets. 
 
Policy makers should be mindful of regulations when it comes to regulating 
and controlling generic producers and prices. As with branded prices, direct 
control measures can also decrease generic prices. In parallel empirics 
suggest that reference pricing might even increase the prices as producers 
seem to remain closer to originators. All other regulations showed no 
significant impact and seem not to be useful to decrease or increase prices. 
Therefore policy implications should focus on market behaviour and provide 
incentives and market freedom for competition and entry of more generic 
producers. 
 87 
 
As seen from the analysis, to decrease drug prices, policy makers should 
increase the number of generic producers and improve possibilities for 
generic entry. This would yield decreasing pharmaceutical prices. This way 
competition among producers can be improved and prices in a market can be 
reduced for better allocation. Intuitively, most regulations do probably 
decrease the number of generic producers and should, hence, not be 
implemented in order to achieve market competition. However, most 
regulation variables request a political trade-off. The suggested direct price 
controls, on the one hand, decreases pharmaceutical prices and, on the 
other hand, decreases market freedom and generic entry. Therefore policy 
makers need to consider this ambiguous effect. 
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VII. Appendix 
 
VII.1 Tests 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test for lprice (before robust standard errors) 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lprice 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.83 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1761 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test for lpricegen (before robust standard errors) 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lpricegen 
 
         chi2(1)      =   189.01 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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Abstract 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit den ansteigenden Kosten in 
Pharmamärkten in Europa. Ziel ist es empirisch unterlegte Implikationen für 
Politiker zu liefern, um den anhaltenden Trend der ansteigenden Kosten im 
Pharmasektor zu unterbinden. Hierfür wird vorerst die Problematik der 
ansteigenden Kosten im Pharmamarkt beleuchtet, eine ausführliche 
Einführung in mögliche Erstattungs- und Preisregulierungen für 
Medikamente  gegeben und der derzeitige Regulierungsstand in sechs 
ausgewählten Ländern in Europa (Deutschland, England, Frankreich, 
Schweden, Niederlande und Dänemark) beschreiben. Anhand eines IMS 
Datensatz (1991-2006) werden anschließend in den ausgewählten Ländern 
empirisch die Einflüsse spezifischer Regulierungen auf patentierte und 
generische Preise untersucht. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur 
wenige Regulierungen einen statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf die Preise 
von Medikamenten haben, jedoch der Wettbewerb mit Generika und die 
Anzahl der Generika in einem Markt, Preise signifikant verringern können. 
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